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New Case Filed - Other Claims Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion & Affidavit for Waiver of Fees 
Motion & Affidavit for Appointment of Counsel 
Order Denying Motion for Counsel, Fee Waiver, 
Prelim. Injunction 










Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
(7) Summons Filed 
Affidavit Of Service (01/15/08) 
Certificate Of Mailing 
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial (Kubinski for 












Motion to Dismiss Certain Named Defendants 
Motion to Amend Civil Rights Complaint 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Summons Filed 
Affidavit in Support of Amended Complaint 
Amended Affidavit in Support of Amended 
Complaint 




Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper Hearing Scheduled (Status 05/29/2008 03:OO 
PM) 
Affidavit of Pamela Herold RE: Service of 
Complaint 
Notice of Change of Address (William Lightner) 







Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Show Cause 
Non Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Certain 
Defendants 
RESP CCTOWNRD Response To Motion to Amend Civil Rights 
Complaint 











Response To Motion to Show Cause Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 











Motion with Affidavit and Support 
Notice Resetting Status Conf. 
Continued (Status 06/12/2008 03:OO PM) 
Motion to Vacate Hearing 
Motion to Transport 
Motion to Dismiss Motion to Compel 
Notice Of Service 
Notice Of Service Ronald J. W r b  





&@rth Judicial District Coutt - Ada Counqd User: CCLUNDMJ 
Time: 08:51 AM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 4 Case: CV-OC-2007-20193 Cunent Judge: Ronald J, Wilper 
William Lightner, etal, vs. John Hardison, etal. 
Date Code User Judge 
Hearing result for Status held on 0611212008 Ronald J. Wilper 
O3:OO PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Caurt Reporter: 











Amended Complaint Filed Ronald J. Wilper 
(3) Summons Filed Ronald J. Wilper 
Affidavit Of Service of Richard Drennon 6.17.083 Ronald J. Wilper 
Answer Eo Amended Complaint and Jury Ronald J. Wilper 
Demand (M Kubinski for Hardison, Nelson, & 
Reinke) 
HRSC DCABBOSM Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/18/2009 09:OO Ronald J. Wilper 
AM) 
HRSC DCABBOSM Hearing Scheduled (Civil Pretrial Conference Ronald J. Wilper 





Order Setting Proceedings and Trial Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion to Dlsqualify Judges Becker, Goff, Ronald J. Wilper 
Hurlbutt, Judd, Meehl, Shilling, Woodland and 
Trout 
ORDR DCABBOSM Order Denying Motion to Disqualify Various Ronald J. Wilper 
Judges, Without Prejudice 
MOTN CCRANDJD Renewed Motion to Disqualify Judge Daniel Ronald J. Wilper 
Hurlbutt 






Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion for More Definite Answers and Affidavit in Ronald J. Wilper 
support 
NOHG CCRANDJD Notice Of Hearing re Motion for More Definite Ronald J. Wilper 





Motion to Transport Ronald J. Wilper 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Ronald J. Wilper 
Transport 
MlSC CCMCLlLl Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Ronald J. Wilper 









Notice Of Service Ronald J. Wilper 
Notice Vacating Hearing Ronald J. Wilper 
Amended Notice of Hearing (Hearing Scheduled Ronald J. Wilper 
1 1/14/2008 1 1 :00 AM) 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Ronald J. Wilper 
11/14/2008 11:OO AM: District Court Hearing 
DCHH DCJOHNSI 
Held 
Court Reoorter: cromwell 
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Order Denying Motion for More Def. Statement 
Motion for Summary Judgment Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronaid J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Memorandum in Support of MSJ 
Affidavit of John Hardison 
Affidavit of Mark A Kubinski 
Affidavit of Jill WhiMngton 
Notice of Hearing Scheduled (Motion for 
Summary Judgment 12/29/2008 1 1:00 AM) 
Ronald J. Wilper 
MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion to Amend Order Setting Proceedings and 
Trial 
Ronald J. Wilper 
1 1/25/2008 ORDR DCABBOSM Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Amend 
Order Setting Proceedings and Trial 





Amended Notice Of Hearing Ronaid J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 12/22/2008 02:OO PM) Amended 
12/9/2008 RSPN CCBOYlDR Response and Objection to States' Motion for 
Summary Judgment with Affidavit in Support 
(2) Affidavit 
Ronald J. Wilper 
AFFD 
12/1 512008 REPL 
CCBOYlDR 
CCG WALAC 
Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J, Wilper Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
1 211 612008 MOTN 
121 17/2008 AFFD 
CCWRIGRM 
CCNELSRF 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of William Lightner Ronald J. Wilper 
Ronald J. Wilper Affidavit of Mark Kubinski In Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Strike Affidavit of William 
Lig htner 
1 21 1 912008 NOTC CCDWONCP Notice of Filing Affidavit in Support of Response 
to Defendants' Motion to Strike William Lightner's 
Affidavit 
Ronald J. Wilper 
12/22/2008 DCHH DCJOHNSI Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
held on 12/22/2008 02:OO PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: cromwell 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Amended-50 
Ronald J, Wilper 
Order Granting Def. Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Ronald J. Wilper 




DCJOHNSI Civil Disposition entered for: Amersfoort, Tony, 
Defendant; Blades, Randy, Defendant; 
Greenland, Co, Defendant; Hardison, John, 
Defendant; Kirkman, Jeff, Defendant; Mcintire, 
Trent, Defendant; Nelson, Steve, Defendant; 
Reinke, Brent, Defendant; Lightner, Marcia, 
Plaintiff; Lightner, William, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
1/29/2009 
Ronald J. &DPoos STAT DCJOHNSI STATUS CHANGED: Closed 
a'$+* 
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Miscellaneous Payment: Transcript Of Recording Ronald J. Wilper 
Per Page Paid by: Lightner Receipt number: 
001 6481 Bat&: 21912009 Amount: $15.00 
(Credtt card) 
Motion To Reconsider The Courts Order Ronald J. Wilper 
Granting Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of Motion For Ronald J. Wilper 
Reconsideration 
Affidavit of Marcia Lightener in Support of Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
For Reconsideration 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the Ronald J. Wilper 
Court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Ronald J. Wilper 
Motion & Affidavit For Fee Waiver on Appeal Ronald J. Wilper 
Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Ronald J. Wilper 
Notice of Intent to Deny Motion Ronald J. Wilper 
Amended Notice of Appeal Ronald J. Wilper 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion And Affidavit for Ronald J. Wilper 
Fee Waiver on Appeal 
Aftidavit of Mark A. Kubinski Ronald J. Wilper 
Affidavit of Marcia Lightner for Fee Waiver on Ronald J. Wilper 
Appeal 
Affidavit of William Lightner for Fee Waiver on Ronald J. Wilper 
Appeal 




PO Box 14 
Roisc [I), 83714 
Plaintiffs, 
Marcia I,ightner 
300 I1 41't Street 
Garden City, Id, 83714 
Plaintiffs, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 





John Hardison, Randy Blades, 
Steve Nelson, Jeff Kirkman, 
Trent McIntire, Tony Amersfoort, 




1 42 U.S.C. 1983 







1. William Lightner is a citizen of Idaho, presently residing at ISCI P. 0. Box 14 
Boise, ID. 83707. 
2. Marcia Lighlner is a citizen of Idaho presently residing at 300 E 41Si Street Garden 
City, ID. 83714. 
42 U.S.C. 19f23Civik Cmp1aint -1- 
Defendant's 
3. John Ilardison is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISGI P.O. Box 14 
Boise ID. 83707. At the time the claim alleged in this complimt arose, the 
defendant was acting under the color of the State law. In the capacity of ISCI 
Warden. He is ultimately responsible for the events and actions of staff at ISCI. 
4. Randy Blades, is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is IDOC' 1299 N. Orchard Ste # 
I10 Boise, ID 83706. At the time the claim alleged in this compliant arose, the 
defendant was acting under the color of the State law, in the former capacity of 1SCl 
warden. 
5.  Steve Nelson is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is IDOC 1299 N. Orchard 
Ste # I  10 Boise, ID 83706. At the time of the claim alleged in this complairzt 
arose, the Defendant was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of 
the ISCI Deputy Warden of Operations. 
6. Jeff Kirkrnan is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISCZ P.O. Box 14 Boise Id. 
83707. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint arose, the Defendant 
was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of the ISCI wardens 
assistant, and was involved with the reinstatement of visiting through and by ex- 
warden Blades. 
7. Trent McIntire, is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISCI, P.O. Box 14 Boise, ID 
83707. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint arose, the Defendant 
was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of the ISCI visiting 
room Sgt. 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -2- 
8, CO 'I'ony Anrershorl, is a citizen of fdr-tho, who's address is ISGI 
P.O. Box 14 Boise, IT). 83707. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint 
arose, the defendant was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of the 
lSG1 visiting room conectional officer. 
9. CO GreenIand, is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISCI P.O. Box 14 Boise, ID. 
83707. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint arose, the defendant was 
acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of the ISCI visiting room 
correctional officer. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is asserted pursuant to IG 1-705 and 1C 18-3 10 ( 1). 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
10. William and Marcia Lightner have been legally married for 1 1 years. 
I 1. Marcia Lightner was arrested by information on or about 10 April 2007 and 
released by the Court on bail. 
12. On or about 12 April 2007 Marcia Lightner was informed by Steve Nelson 
that do to her recent arrest her visiting privileges were indefinitely suspended. 
13. 'This suspension continued for 10 weeks, while Randy Blades was ISGI 
warden. After appealing the issue to Warden Blades by writing him a letter of 
explanation about the arrest and unjust actions taken against their visiting, Warden 
Blades reinstated the Lightner's visiting. He had his assistant, Jeff Kirkman contact 
Marcia Lightner informing her that she was again approved by the warden to visit. 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -3- 
14. As of 1 October 2007 without f u ~ h c r  incident or conflict, new, cument bvarden 
Wardisotl again suspended Marcia Lightner's visiting privileges with her husbarrd do 
to her April 07 arrest. 
CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM 1 
15. ' h e  Plaintips allege that Section 13 of the Idaho Statc Constitution, md llSCA 
Constitutional Amendment 14 was broke when Marcia received punishlent without 
due process. 
SUPPORTING FACTS 
16. "Thai tuking awuy ofprivilegs is u fbrm ofpunishment. In the It'nited Stares u 
person is to he presumed innocent untilproven guilty. ' I n  the Plaintiffs case. the 
opposite has been found to be true. Marcia Lightner is being presumed guilty of a 
crime prior to going to Court, and is receiving punishment by the Defendant's without 
having been given a hearing. Even inmates receiving Disciplinary Offence Reports 
(DOR's), in the penal system are entitled to a due process hearing. The Lightners are 
being punished, by loosing the closest thing they have to a normal setting with each 
other and that was to visit each seek.  It has been said, and well known that to keep a 
family union together, it is vitally important to share time together. It is also 
necessary to have family support to functionally rehabilitate inmates. To deprive 
William of his right to visit his wife is cruel and unusual when due process "A 
Constitutional Right" is ignored. 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -4- 
17. Hardison quotes policy 60.1 which is (NOT LAW), but which sttatcs: 
"'r'erminution of Yisiting Ijrivileges Visiting privileges may be terminated at the 
dhcretion ~J'thejueiZiby head or designee for any lensh oJ-lime, including 
permanently, for violation or a~ter?ylted violation ofuny state ortkderal Zuw, uny 
hoar~i rule, policy cmd procedure. SCIP, yield memorun&, orxailure lo follow stqf 
i~~strucrions (ervlphases au'dedf. " 
18. 1,ightners claim that their Due Process Rights ase being violated by receiving 
a punishent  prior to a conviction, or even a hearing. Due process is a guaranteed 
Constitutional Right the Plaintips are entitled to. Lightners also claim that Policy 
604 does not even mention a due process hearing. If this policy is to be interpreted 
that due process is not necessary, then it violates the entire judicial system, and should 
be deemed an illegal policy. 
19. It is clear that the Lightners had an established visiting schedule in which they visited 
three times each week with out incident. To now initiate a visiting restriction on the 
Lightners served no legitimate Pena logical objectives. In other words, there was no 
legitimate governmental interest present to over ride the Lightners Constitutional 
rights. 
20. Marcia Lightner had passed the adequate procedural safeguards prison 
officials used when they granted her normal visiting privileges. Each year she 
renewed her application and was approved. To take away those privileges from an 
incident unrelated to the prison, in which had no baring on her visiting without due 
process, is punishment and a USCA Constitutional Amendment 14 violation. 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -5- 
Lightner's claim that it~arcia" visiting p~vileges could have been taken if she 
bas found guilty by a Court of law. But to have her visits suspended without due 
process of law is a violation of their Constitutional Rights. 
Hardison's memo goes on to say "PentJing the outcome c!fherfekony charges shc 
nzay reil;nplyfor vi.sititzg. " In essence, IIardison is openly and in w~iting, admitting 
that he is fully aware that Lightner has not yet been accorded a due process hearing in 
a Court of Law. We has taken it upon himself to be the Judge and executioner, to 
place sentencing upon Lightner without holding the body of authority to do so. 
Hardison's position (As he puts it ) is to use discretion as being the facility head, he 
is not the judge, jury and executioner. His position requires him to review the facts 
of security issues to the facility, and the Lightner's claim there are NO security issues 
concerning their Visiting. When Marcia Lightner never posed a risk to the institution 
prior to her arrest, or since her reinstatement fiom warden Blades. No special 
circumstances exist that would warrant the disregard of due process. 
To bar the Lightner's from visiting with each other, causes distress and mental 
anguish from the separation. Violating their due process rights is not only cruel and 
unjust punishment, it also inflicts injury to the survival of their marriage and has 
caused depression and health issues that normally would not have otherwise arisen. 
The suspension of their visitation was an a typical and significant hardship in relation 
to the ordinary incidents of prison life. USGA Constitutional Amendment 14. 
The Lightner's did not receive any written notification prior to the suspension, They 
did not receive a hearing, nor were they afforded an appeal procedure. While Prison 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -6- 
000012 
inmates do not have a right to visiation, both visitors and inmates must be given the 
right to administrative in judicial review of such restrictions. 
CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM I1 
26. ' f ie Lightner's also claims that the ternination of their visiting privileges 
is not just due to Warcia3 spending charge, but was aimed directly as a form of 
hrassment and retaliation. 
SUPPORTING FACTS 
27. 'The Lightner's married in 1997. This was fiowned upon, because Marcia 
Lightner had previously worked at Swanson's Commissary as a contract vender, 
(Not a State Employee). 
28. Even after they were married, out of just pure meanness, the Lightners were denied 
visiting privileges for 2 years. 
29. Marcia Lightner had to hire an attorney to assist them in getting their visiting 
approved. After 5 months of legal intervention, the 1,ightners was given their 
visiting privileges . Rut to continue the harassment, they were separated with a glass 
partition for another year. It was then a total of 3 years and 5 months of no contact 
and normal interaction before the Lightner's were given normal visiting privileges. 
30. Once normal visiting was approved, the warden, out of continued harassment and 
retaliation transferred William to Idaho Correctional Institution Orofino (ICIO). 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -7- 
3 1. Mascia 1,ightner followed her husband to Oroilno, rented a home and staded 
School in Lewiston. This did not deter the prisons atternpt to keep the Li&mers 
sepmated. This time they moved Wil l im to a county jail at the other side of the State 
in Idaho Falls ID. That act caused mother 1 I mon&s of sepzation before William 
was eventually moved back to ICI0. 
32. For eleven (1  1) years, State prison officials have harassed md aniempted to separate 
the Lightner". This ha?; caused mental torment, anguish, and depression, not to 
mention the cost involved. 
3 3 .  Marcia Lightner poses no securiv risk. It is simply harassment to now again suspend 
her visits in the name of security, from an alleged incident that was not even at or 
connected to the prison. 
34. The Lightners assert that their visitation was suspended for reasons other than 
Marcia's pending charge. That being, retaliation against the Lightners because they 
exercised their bdamental rights perfected by the Constitution to address other 
issues they had in the courts. 
35. The 14& Amendment states in part "nor skull uny SIuk deprive uny penon dl*, 
liberty, or proper@, with out due process o f h .  " The Petitioners clairn that 
Marcia's visitation in liberty interest was interfered with by ISCI officials with out 
due Process, because it was being done in retaliation. Consequently, this imposes a 
typical and significant hardship on the Lightner's Marriage in relation to the ordinasy 
incidents of prison life. 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -8- 
CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM 111 
36. Claim three (3) is also a violation of Idaho State Constitulion Article 13. It States 
"No person shulI he iwier put in jeoprdyjbr the same uf i2~ce " The Lightners visits 
were suspended for hur (3) months in April f i r  Marcia's mest. To now suspend 
them again for the same mest is Ilouble Jeopardy. 
SUPPORTING FACTS 
37. The Ligbtner's were denied visiting from 12 April, 200'7 until 20 July, 2007 due to 
Marcia's 10 April 2007 arrest. 
38. After having missed 41 visits. Marcia appealed the legality of the suspension to 
Warden Randy Blades. Warden Blades, after concern and reconsideration, reinstated 
their visiting privileges and Marcia was notified by telephone from Jeff Kirkman, that 
she could resume her visiting with her husband. 
39. Upon replacing Randy Blades as warden, John Hardison again suspended Lightners 
visits for the same April incident. Having lost visiting privileges once without due 
process was bad enough but to now lose them a second time for the same offence is 
Double Jeopardy. 
PREVIOUS LAWSUITS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF 
40. 'The Lightners have sought informal relief from the appropriate administrative 
officials by talking personally, and on the phone to Prison officials when their visits 
were Suspended. 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -9- 
41. As of the suspension idicted by Warden I-lasdison 1 October 2007 the 
Plaintiffs have exhausted the prison &evance system md making appeals 
with the Corporate IDOC oEces. No relief was given. 
42. W e n  all efforls t'ailed to get the visiting reinstated, The Lightners filed a tort claim at 
the S e c r e w  of Shte? s f ice ,  and then this civil action. 
CONCLUSION 
43. It is stated in reply that "Per visiting SOP 604.02.01.001" ISCI would not allow 
Marcia Lightner visiting privileges. Just because the Defendants have a written 
Sbndad Operation Procedure (SOP) or a policy in place, does not make it legal. To 
deny someone visiting privileges because of an allegation is one thing, but to take that 
established privilege away because of an allegation is punishent. Prison officials 
themselves from allegations outside prison activity have tried, convicted and 
sentenced Marcia 1,ightner by denying her visits. 
44. To invoke a punishment without due process simply as a policy and procedure is 
Unconstitul-ional. It is slanderous, and creates mental and emotional torture. It has 
been stated, that Idaho values marriages and family unity. Their Policies and 
Procedures should show it. IDOG Policies and Procedures should coincide with the 
Constitution and not violate the rights of a husband and wife from having a normal 
setting of spending a valuable, and nourishing time together. 
45. Elected Governmental bodies have stated that Idaho promotes families, and family 
unity. It should therefore be the States stand to promote and encourage family 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -10- 
000016 
visivdtions. 'This recognition is based on the impoflance of visitation to inmates. 
Visi~tion has been widely recognized as indispensable to rehdbilitalion. 
46. With respect to having their visits suspended, thc Lightners were not given the 
opportunity to be heard or present evidence because there was no hearing of any kind. 
'They were not allowed to conti-ont accusers or cross examine witnesses. In fact, they 
were not afforded any kind of procedure before being deprived they visiting 
privileges, 
47. Under these circumstances, the rest of ewoneous deprivation unquestionably was 
heightened. In the probable value of having employed at least some procedural safe 
guards is considerable. It must be ruled that the Lightners should have been given due 
process to ensure that the State-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated. 
48. Suspending the Lightner's visits without due process is a Constitutional violation of 
their rights. To do it twice for the same offence is willful malice with intent to harass 
and inflict psychologically injury. 
49. The Lightner's due process rights have been violated. They were subjected to 
harassment and Double Jeopardy, and are entitled to relief and compensation. 
lZEQUEST FOR RELIEF 
50. The Lightner's request the following relief: 
A. 'That while incarcerated, William Lightner #41438 will not be moved 
from his current housing assignment. If he is again moved, it would have to be taken 
as a serious form of retaliation do to the filing of this law suit. William Lightner is 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -1 1 - 
his cment housing assignment. 
8. ?hat the Lightners receive noma1 visiting privileges, equal to, other visitors and that 
to be denied visiting with out just eaxlse would bc considered a contempt of court. 
C. 'I'l~at h r  the Constitutio~al violations, the Lighwers be awarded $100,000.00 plus 
$5000.00 per visit that has been uneonstitutiomlly taken away from them. 
D. That lDOC be ordered to change their visiting Policy anci Procedures so that they 
reflect Constitutional standards. 
li. Anything clse the Court feels the Lightners are due or entitled to. 
F. Finally, that these issues be heard and detemined by a jury. 
Dated this day o 008 
Dated this - d a y  08 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -12- 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
(ss 
County of Ada 1 
William Lightner, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 'That he is a Plaintiff in 
the above entitled action, that he has read the forgoing Complaint, knows the contents 
thereof, and that the facts therein staled arc true as he verily believes. 
SUBSCNDED AND SWORN to before me this 3/:,'day of October, 2007. 
I 
Residing at 
Gomrnission expires .s - / @ - 2 0 ,  o 
Marcia Lightner, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: That she is a Plaintiff in the 
above entitled action, that she has read the forgoing Compl~nt,  knows the contents 
<' 
thereof, and that the facts therein stated are true as she verily believes. 
C 
I 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of C ) C ~ K ~  2007. 
AMY WOWON 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -1% 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I M R C I A  LIGHTNER, DO I iEREBYSWUR UNDER PENALTYOFYUR/URY 
THAT A TRUE AND CvORREC'T C f P Y  O F  THIS CIVIL RIGHTLY COhfPLAINT: AND 
PRELIMINARY INJUM'TION U S  BEEN M I Z E D  TO DEFENDANTS BY GIERTIFIED 
lJS MAIL. 
WARDEN JOHN IlARDlSON et., al., INCLUDNG AND CN CARE OF: TRENT 
MCINTIRE, TONY AMERSFOORT, JEFF KIKMAN, AND CO GREENLAND, 
ISCI PO BOX 14 BOISE, ID 83707 
RANDY BLADES, IDOC 1299 N. ORCHARD STE # 110 BOISE, ID 83706. 
STEVE NELSON, IDOC 1299 N. ORCHARD STE # 110 BOISE, ID 83706. 
Dated this /// 
42 U.S.C. 1983 Civil Rights Complaint -14- 
PAUL R. PAmmR,XSB #3X89 
Lead Deputy, Corrections Section 
M A. NSm, ISB Jf5275 
Deputy Attomey General 
Idaho Depament of Colsectioa 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 1 I0 
Boise, Iddhd 83706 
Telephone (208) 658-2097 
Facsimile: (208) 327-7485 
s DAVID NAMRRO, Clerk 
By A GARDEN 
DEPUTY 
Attolneys for Defendants 
IN THE DXSTMCT COURT OF FOURTR NDXCIAIL, DIS 
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Corn Now Defendants, by and though undersigned counsel and hereby answer 
aid respond to Plaintiff's verified Civil Rigl~ts Complaint ("Complaint") on file in this 
action. Defendants deny eaclz and every allegation in Plaintiffs' Complaint, unless 
specifically and expressly admitted herein. 
ANSWZR AND JURY D E W D - - 1  
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1. Auswelislg the allegations coabhed xn Parasap11 2,  DeRndmts a & ~ t  
only that Plaintiff William Lil&&ier 1s presently hcarcerated at ISGT. 
2. b w e r i n g  the allegations conained in Paragapfi 2, Defendmlcs lack 
sufficient howledge or infbx~~lat~on necessary to f o m ~  a belief as to the truth of the 
maeers assmed, md &lrerc.efore presently deny tlie same. 
3. Answering the allegations contained in Pa~agaph  3, Defendmts a&& that 
Defenda~t: FXardisol~ is the Wuden at ISCI and to the extent he was acting w i t b  the 
course and scope of his employment, he was acting under color of state law. Defendants 
fil-tI~er admit that as Wa-den, Defet~datlt I3ardison is the supervisor of ISCI s m ,  
however, Defendmts deny any cllaracteriation or jl-uplication that by v h e  o f  h ~ s  
position Defendant Hardison is vxca~iously liable fbr any alleged cotnduct of his staff. 
4. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph 4, Defendants admit that 
Defendant Blades was previously the Warden at ISCX and to the extent be was acting 
within the course and scope of 111s employment, he was acting under color of state law. 
5. Answering tlie alIegations contained in 1Pa;ragr-aph 5, Defendants admit .that 
Defendant Nelson was prevxously a Deputy Wardetz at ISCI and to the extent that he was 
acting within the course and scope of his employnient, he was acting under color of state 
law. 
6. Ausweriilg the allegations contained in Paragraph 6, Defendants adinit that 
Defendat Kishatl was previously ail assistant to the Warden and to the extent that he 
was acting within the c o m e  and scope of his employment, he was actbig under color of 
state law. Defendants further aQilit that Defendant Kirkman had some involvemex~t 
regarding Plaintiffs' visitation issues. 
ANSWER AM) JURY D E m m - - 2  
7 Answekg the al.llegr-ttio~~s contamed in Parapaph 7, Defendants adxxlxt tlrar 
Defendant Mclratirc is an DOC e~nployee and to the extei~t hat be was actmg wichin the: 
cou-se amid scope of his emplaymem, he was &cling under color of state Ixw. 
8. Answer~ng the allegatiolis coiitained in Paxagaph 8 ,  Defendants adznit that 
Defendant h e m f o o t  is an ID06 employee and to the extent that Ize was srcti~tg withul 
the course a id  scope of his employment, he was acting mder color of state law. 
9. hsweriug the allegations cout~ned in Paxasaph 9, Defendan& a&iGt that 
Defei~dant Greenland is an U)OC employee md to Qe extent that he was a~tjslg witbin 
the course and scope of his employnent, he was actkg ~inder color of state law. 
10. Answering the allegations contailled in the Paramph Igbeled ' 
"Jurisdiction," Defendants adknit &e Court has jurisdictioli pursllartt to Idaho Code 1- 
705; however, Defendants deny that Idaho Code 9 18-3 IO(1) provides a basis for 
jurisdiction. 
1 1. Answering the allegations contained in Pxagaph 10, Defendalzts lack 
sufficient knowledge or iilfomiation necessay to foim a belief as to the truth o f  the 
matters asserted, and therefore; presently deny the same. 
12 Answering the allegations contained in Paragrap11 I 1, Defendmts adinit 
Plaintiff Marcia Li&b~er was arrested on or about April 10,2007. Wtb respect to the 
remaining allegations, however, Defendants lack sufEcient howledge or iiifoiaiation 
necessary to forin a belief as to the truth o f  the matters asset-ted, and therefore presently 
deny the same. 
ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND-3 
13. Anstvehng the dilleg;2rions con&ed in Psagr:raph 12, Defcudants admit 
only that on or about April 12,2007, Plaintiff Marcia Li&tner's v i s ~ t a ~ o s  privileges 
were suspended. 
14. Answehg the allegat.loris coxlained in Paragaph 13, Defendarzts admit 
only that aIter approxin~ately three months of suspension, plaintiff Marcia Liglltner's 
Visitation privileges were reimtated. 
15. Answering the dlegations contained xn Paragraph 14, Defendmts admit 
0111~  that on or about October 1,2007, Plaintiff Marcia Light~ler's v is i ta~on ylrxvileges 
were suspended. Defendants deny all r e m a ~ n g  aIlega&ons contaixled in this parag~aph. 
16, Defendants deny the allegations eontauled in Paragraphs 15 and 16. 
17. Defendants admit the allegations contained in Paragraph 17. 
18. Defendmts deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 18, 19,20, and 
19. Answering tbe allegations contained in Paragraph 22, Defendants admit 
the allegatiolls contained in the first sentence thereof. Defendants deny all remaining 
allegatioils contained in this paragraph. 
20. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 23 and 24. 
2 1 .  Answerii-rg the allegatiorrs contained in Paragraph 25, Defendants admit 
only that Plaintiffs were not given a hearing prior to suspension of Plaintiff Marcia 
Li&mer3s visitation privileges. Defendants deny all remaining allegations contained iri 
this paragraph, specifically including any characterization or implication that Plaintiffs 
had a due process right in their visiting privileges. 
22. Defendants deny the allegntions contained in Paragraph 26. 
ANSWER AND JURY D E W 4  
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23. hswering the allegations contained in Parapap11 27,lDcfen&1xts adnit 
only that PlaintiE Mxcia Lightner previously worlced for ail IDOC collCract vendor. 
With respect to the rernak~mg allegat~ons, however, Defelldants lack sufficient 
howledge or hforl~ation ecessary to form a belief as to the truth o f f  e matters 
asserted, and therefore pi-esently deny the saxr.le. 
24. Defendants deny the allegations co~ztained in Para@-aph 28. 
25. Answering the allegations coutamed in Paragaph 29, Defenda~ts Lack 
sufficient knowledge ox infomxtion szecessary to form a belief as to the hxstil of the 
matters asserted, arid therefore presently deny the sanle. 
26. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragirlph 30. 
27. Answerilig the allegations contained in. Paragraph 3 1, wit11 respect to the 
first sentence, Defendants lack suficient knowledge or iirfozxmtion necessary to form a 
belief as to the truth of the matters assested, and therefore presently deny tlze sanze. 
Defendants deny all remaining allegations contained in. tlnxs paragraplz. 
28. DelFendants deny the allegations colltained in Para~aphs  32,33,34, and 
35. 
29. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 36. 
30. Defendants admit the allegations contained in Parngaph 37. 
3 2 .  Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph 38, Defendants admit 
only that Plaintiff Marcia Lightner's visitatton privileges were temporarily reinstated. 
Defendam deny all remaining allegations contained in this paragraph. 
ANSWER AND JURY D E M D - 5  
32. Answerhg the allegafions conthed in Parapapb 39, Dekxxdants a d n ~ t  
the alfegabons contained in the first sentence thereof. Defendants deny all re~naining 
allegations contailled in this paragaph. 
33. hswenng the allegaliom coizkined ill Paragaph 40, Defc~~dauts admit 
that Plaintips had son= contact uri.th XDOC oEc~als  regarding .their visitation privileges; 
however, Defendants deny m y  chazcterization or inwlication that Plax'xltiffs have 
exhausted tlie administrative gt-ievarrce process. 
34. Defendants deny the allegations col~tained in Pmp;raph 41. 
35. hswer ing  the allegations contained in Piu-agraph 42, Defe~x&nts admit 
only that Plaintifcfs filed a notice of tort: claim prior to filing this action. 
36. Defendants dleiiy the allegations colitained in Paxagaplls 43 and 44, 
37. Answering the allegations contamed m Paragraph 45, Defendants state 
that such allegations consist of conclusory statemen& to which no response is required. 
To the extent a response is deemed necessary, the allegaQons are denled. 
38. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 46,47,48, and 
49. 
39. Defendants deny &e allegations contamed u7. Pwagraph 50, i~icluding 
subparagraphs A through F, thereof. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Defendants have not been able to engage in sufficient discovety necessary to 
learn all of the facts and circumstances relating to the matters described in Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and theiefoore request the Court to permit Defendants to amend their Answer 
and assert additrouai aEumat~ve defemes or nbaudon aKirxnative defenses once discovery 
has been completed. 
That PlainLiSfsa Coxl~plaht fails to state a cause of action against the Defendants 
upon which rel~ef can be gai~ted and should therefore be disinissed pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Ldafio Rules of Civil Procedure. 
r‘ DEFENSE 
That the allegations contained in the Plaintigs' Coniplah~t do not rise to the level 
ofa deprivation of rights that are protected by the Coilstitution or my of the legal 
provmslons refened to in the Plaiutiffs' Complaint. 
FO'U3RTH DEFENSE 
That Defendants acted in a reasonable and prudent fashion satisfying any duty, if 
any, that they owed under the rules, 1-e~~lations, statutes, ordinances, customs, policles 
and usages the State of Idalzo and/or the United States of America. 
FIFTH DEFEHSE 
That Defendants are immune from, liability because the acts or orxissions 
complained of, if any, were done by Defemidants in good faith, with honest, reasonable 
belief that such actions were necessary and lawful at the t h e  they occu~xed. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
That Defcfetldants are immune, or have qualified iimnunity, to the allegatiolis 
contained in the Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
SEVENTH DEFENSE 
All general im~~unities statutory or otherwise applicable. 
ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND-7 
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PlaintzEfs have failed to exhaust the availdle admriisQ%tivc remecfies, and 
otbelwise failed to compIy with available administrative remedies. 
NXBTH DEFENSE 
To the extent that the Plaix-tt~ffs are asserting state law claims, the lrab~l~ty, rf any, 
of Defendants fbr any state law c l a m  or causes of action 1s lini~ted pursuant to the 
pr,rovislons of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. In asserting this def~ l~se ,  Defenda~~ts are in no 
way conceding or admitt~ng liability. 
TENTH DEFENSE 
To the extent that the PlaintlEs are asserting state law claims against Defendants, 
some or all of such cla~xi~s are barred since they arise out of andlor stem.frorn activities 
for which Defendants axe i~mxune from liability by virtue of the provisions of the Idaho 
Tor$ Clauns Act. 
ETAEVENTH DEFENSE 
That Defendants are not liable in litigation ptusuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, for any 
inju~y caused by the act or omission o f  another person under the theory of respondeat 
stlperior. 
DVELmH DEFENSE 
That the claims and damages set forth in the PlainriffsToiilplaint are barred by 
the doctri~~e of ui~clean hands. 
ANSWER AM) JURY DEMAND--8 
To tbe extelnt that the Plaintifs are asserdag state: law claims against Defendants, 
some or a11 of such claims are bmed by the failure of the PlalntBs to comply with the 
Idaho Tort Claim Act. 
That Pia~ntilTs have failed to con~ply with the bonding requirenzent set forth in 
Idaho Code $ 6-61 0. 
~ U X l l E  11 
Plaintiffs~laims are brought frivolously and unreasonably and are not well 
pounded h fact or law and Defendanh are elltitled to sanctions against Plaintiffs 
pursuant to Rule 1 1 of the Idaho Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
m y  DEMkYD 
Defendants, p m a n t  to Rule 38@) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Proceduxe, hereby 
demands a trial by jury. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Defendants have been required to retain attonneys in order to defend tllis action 
and are entrtled to recover reasonable aMoriley fees pursuant to fedexal and state law and 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
VV)-IEUFOU, Defendaxle pray for judgment against tlie Plaintiff as follows: 
1. That tlie Plaintiffs' Complaint be disnlissed with prejudice and that the 
Plaintigs take nothing thereunder. 
AfrlSWER AND JURY DEMAN1)--9 
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P, Oil 
2. That the Defendant$ be awarded their cog&, h~cluding reasonable 
attorneys' fees pursuant to state and fedeml. Xaw, iacIuding 42 U,S,C, $ 1988, Idaho Code 
9s  6-91 8A, 12-1 1'7, 12-121, and "che Idaho Rules of Civil Procedtire 
3. That judgment be mrered in favor of Beferrdnnts on at1 cltlirns for relief. 
4. For such other and hrtber relief as the Cour* deex~lrs ~ u s t  and equitable 
Respecthlly submitted this y of Feb~u~ry ,  2008. 
STATE OF Dm0 
OFFICE OF 
DepuQ Attonley General, 
Counsel for Defendants 
CEKTLFICATE OF SERVXCE 
I l3E?.EBY CERTIFY that on the y oEFebmary, 2008, X caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoi~~g ANSWR AND JURY DE 
Williain Ligktner, # 41438 
ISCT: 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, XD 83707 
Via Prison Mail System 
AND 
Mal-cia Lighmer 
300 E. 41'' Street 
Garden City, ZD 837 14 
Via U.S. Adail 
ANSWER AND JURY DEUND--10 
W ILLlAM 1,IC;I;fl'NER 
ICC #f I 438 UNIT-(I' 
PO Box 7001 0 
BOISE, ID 83707 
MAIZCIA LICH'I-NER 
300 E 41" STmETT 
GARDEN CITY, IT) 837 14 
PLAINTIFFS PROSE 
IN THE DISTI?RICPT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
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COMES NOW, William Lightner and Marcia Lightner, Plaintiffs in the above 
entitled action. pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure -15 (a). Plaintiffs are filing 
this Amended Civil Rights Complaint on 16 June 2008, per the order signed by the 
Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper on 12 June,2008. 
FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT 
PARTIES 
Plaintiffs 
1 .  Willim Lightner is a citizn of Icjho, presently residing at ISCI P. 0. Box 14 
Boise, ID. 83707. 
2. Marcia Eie;htner is a citizen of Idaho presently residing at 300 E 415" Street 
Gmden City, ID. 83714. 
Defendmb 
3. Brent Reinke, is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is IDOC 1299 N. C)f;chard Ste 
if1 10 Boise, ID 83706. At the time the claim alleged in this complaint arose, the 
defendant as acting under the color of the State law. In capacity as Direelor of the 
1DOC 
4. John Hardison is a citizen of Idaho, who's address is ISCI P.O. Box 14 
Boise ID. 83707. At the time the claim alleged in this compliant arose, the 
defendant was acting under the color of the State law. In the capacity of ISCl 
Warden. He is ultimately responsible for the events and actions of slaffat ISCI. 
Steve Nelson is a citizen of ldaho, who's address is lDOC 1299 N. Orchard 
Ste #I10 Boise, ID 83706. At the time of the claim alleged in this complaint 
arose, the Defendant was acting under the color of the State law in the capacity of 
the ISCI Deputy Warden of Operarions. 
FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLANT -1 
JUMSDICTION 
J~sdic t ion  is a s s f i d  p m s m t  to IC-5-201 ETSEG; 42 USC 1983 
N A W W  OF THE CASE 
Willim and Marcia Li&mer have been fegdly m&ed since 1997 
(1 1 y w s )  and rht: age license was approvd and n o w i d  by IDOC persomel. 
Marcia Li&mer was aes ted  by infomAon on or about 10 April 2007 and 
released by the Court on bail. 
On or about 12 April 2007, While siping into visiting, Marcia Lightner was 
informed by Steve Nelson that do to her r a n t  m s t  her visiting privileges were 
suspended indefutitely. 
13. This suspsion continued for 10 weeks, while Randy Blades was ISCl 
Warden. After appealing the issue to Warden Blades by writing him a letter of 
explanation about the anest and unjust actions taken against their visiting, Warden 
Blades reinstated the LiIr&tner% visiting. He had his assistant, Jeff K h a n  contact 
Marcia Lightmix i d o d n g  her that she was again approved by the warden to visit 
without any restrictions. There were NO visiting issues or complaints about the 
Plaintiffs behavior during their visits after the reinstatement by Warden Blades. 
As of I October 2007 without further incident or conflict, the new and current 
Warden Hardison again suspended Marcia Lightner's visiting privileges with her 
husband do to her April 07 arrest. Warden HaEdison contacted Marcia Lightner on 
said day and informed her personally that her visiting was suspended do to the April 
FIRST AMEmED CIVIL MGHTS COMPLAINT -2 
7 arrest. Marcia Lightner told him that she had not been fbund guilty of any crime 
and this action is a violation of her due process rights. 
15. hThen Warden Ifardison teminated the Plaintiffs visits 1 October 2008 prior 
to anj conviction of a I'slony or misdemeanor, he deprived the PlaintilTs of the right to 
Consortium upon this termination he executed, which is a violation of a Constitutional 
Right to husband and wife. 
16. On or about 2 October 2007, Maria Lightner contacted the DOC headquaaers 
for an Appointment with Director Reinke on the suspension of their visiting, and was 
referred to the IDOC investigation depaament. After being denied an appointment 
with the Director. Marcia Lightner mentioned of what took place to the investigator 
and she was told that Urarden Hardison had the official say as to the situation and tiley 
would not reverse the decision. The investigator commented that Marcia Lightner had 
become a security risk. Marcia Lightner then replied that she had not been considered a 
security risk by Warden Blades, and wanted to know what had happened fix them to 
consider this risk now when it did not apply or seem to be an issue when Warden Blades 
reinstated the visiting fbr the Plaintiffs. The response was that Warden Hardison had 
the option per policy of the IDOC to terminate the visiting and that is what hu choose 
to do. Marcia Lightner mentioned that she was not their inmate, and said, even 
inmates get a due process hearing when allegations arise in DOR's. Marcia Lightner 
mentioned that her due process rights were being violated do to not even having a 
hearing prior to the suspension. Marcia Lightrier was then told that her rights didn't 
FIRST &&MENDLiD CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT -3 
m a a r  when it c m e  to the scwri? of the institution. Macia Li&tner responded that 
her righb DID MA-ER, and their policy and procedure did not suwrsede her 
Constitutional Due Process Rights. 
17. Marcia Li&tner &en contacted fomer Warden Rmdy Blades to seek assistance from 
him as to what he might do to help the situation. Mr. Blades sent Marcia Lightner an 
e-mail and mentioned to her that he would have to stand by the new warden's decision. 
18. From October to current date of 14 April 2008, the Lightners visiting srnd loss of 
Gonsortim is still in violation of the C o m o n  Law on their Constitutional Rights 
19. On or about 3 1 March 2008, Marcia Lightner plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge of 
resisting and obstructing with 2 years probation, one year supervised and one 
unsupervised. 
CAUSE OF ACTION CLMM I 
15. The PlaintifFs allege that Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution, and 
United States Constitutional Amendments, 5,6, 8, and 14 were broken when the 
Plaintiffs received punishent without Due process and loss of Consortium, and caused cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
SlLJPPORTING FACTS 
16. "Thai taking mvay ofprivileges is a form ofpunishment. In the United Staies u 
Person is to be presumed innocent mti2proven guilw. " In the Plaintiffs case, the 
opposite has been found to be true. Marcia Lightner is being presumed guilty of a 
crime prior to going to Court, and both plaintiEs are receiving punishment by the 
Defendant's without having been given a hearing. Even inmates receiving 
FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS C O M P L m T  -4 
Discipl iw ORence Reports f DOR"), in the penal system are entitled to a due 
process hearing. The Li&l~lers are being pwnished by way of loss of Consortium, by 
loosing the closest thing they have to a nomal sening with each other and that was to 
visit each week have contact as a married couple should have. It has been said, and 
is a well b o w  that to keep a family union together, it is vitally i m p m t  to share 
time together. Also to hctionaily rehabilitate h a t e s ,  it is necessary to have 
family support. To deprive William of his right to visit his wife is cruel and unusual 
when due proeess ""A Constitutiond Right" is ignored. 
Hardison quotes policy 604 which is (NOT LAW), but which states: 
"Terminofion of Yisiling Privileges, Visiting privileges muy be terminated at the 
dkcretion ofthe facility head or designee for any length of time, including 
Permanently, for violation or atfempted vMIation of'any st-aie ctr federal law, uny 
board rule, policy und procedure. SOP, Jield memoranda, or failure to follow sta# 
irrstructions (emphases aclde4. " 
18. Lightners claim that their Due Process Rights and loss of Consortium are 
being violated by receiving a p ~ s h m e n t  prior to a conviction, or even a hearing. 
Due process is a guaranteed Constitutional Right the Plaintiff's are entitled to. 
Lightners also claim that Policy 604 does not even mention a due process hearing. If 
t h s  policy is to be interpreted that due process is not necessary, then it violates the 
entire judicial system, and should be deemed an itIegal policy. 
FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT -5 
19. It is clear that the Lightners had an esbhlished visiting schedule in which they visited 
three times each week with out incident. To now initiate a visiting restriction on the 
Lightners served no legitimate Pena logical objeclives. In other words, there was no 
legitimate govemental interest present to over ride the Lil;thtners Constitutional 
rights. 
Marcia Lighber had passed the adeqwte prwedurd safeguads prison 
oficials used when they granted her normal visiting privileges. Each year she 
renewed her application and was approved. To take away those privileges from an 
incident urnelated to the prison, in which had nu baring on her visiting without due 
process, is punishent and a United States Constitutional Amendment 14 violation. 
Lighmer's claim that Marcia's visiting privileges could have been taken if she 
was fbusld guiIty by a Court of law. But to have her visits suspended without due 
process of law and the loss of Consortim is a violation of their Constitutional Rights. 
22. Hardison's memo goes on to say "finding the ourcome of'her felany charges 
she may reupplyfir visiting. " In essence, Wardison is openly and in writing, 
admitting that he is fully aware that Lightner has not yet been accorded a due process 
hearing in a Court of Law. He has taken it upon himself to be the Judge and 
executioner, to place sentencing upon the Lightners without holding the body of 
authority to do so. 
Hardison's position (As he puts it) is to use discretion as being the facility 
head, he is not the judge, jury and executioner. His position requires him to review 
FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLANT -6 
the facts of secusity issues to the facility and the Li&tner7s claim there are NO 
security issues concerning their Visiting. W e n  Marcia Lightner never posed a risk 
to the institution prior to her mest, or since her reinstatement from wmden Blades. 
No special circumsmces exist that would t the disregard of due process. 
To bar the Lightner's from visiting with each other, causes distress and mental 
mguish from the separalion. Violating their due process rights and deprives the 
Lightners the right to Consortium is not only emel and unjust putisbent,  it also 
inflicts injury to the survival of their m&age and has caused depression and health 
issues that normally would not have otherwise arisen. The suspension of their 
visitation was an a typical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents 
of prison life. United Stated Constitutional Amendment 14. 
25. The Lightner's did not receive any written notification prior to the suspension. 
They did not receive a hearing, nor were they afforded an appeal procedure. While 
Prison inmates do not have a right to visitation, both visitors and inmates must be 
given the right to administrative in judicial review of such restrictions. 
CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM 11 
The Lightner's also claims that the ternination of their visiting privileges 
is not just due to Mareia"~ pending charge, but was aimed directly as a form of 
harassment and retaliation by certain IDOC officers that has been on going for many 
years. This conduct violated Marcia's rights to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
under United States Constitutiond Amendments, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth. 
FIRST AMENDED CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT -7 
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SUPPORTING F A a S  
27. The Lightner's married in 1997. This wsxf firowed upon, because Marcia 
Lighmer had previously worked at Swmson's C o m m i s v  as a contract vender, 
(Not a Stale Employee). 
28. Even afier they were m&ed, out of just pure m w e s s ,  the IAi&mers were 
denied visiting privi1el;~es for 2 y w s .  
Marcia Lightner had to hire an anorney to assist them in geging their visiting 
approved. After 5 months of legal intervention, the Lightners were given their 
visiting privileges. But to continue the harassment, they were separated with a glass 
partition for another year. It was then a total of 3 years and 5 months of no contact 
and normal interaction before the Lightner's were given normal visiting privileges. 
Once normal visiting was approveci, the warden, out of continued harassment 
and retaliation transferred William to ICC, the newly built correctional facility in 
Kuna Idaho where he was severely beaten and locked down into segregation for seven 
(7) more months that caused, again, another separation with the Lightners visits. 
31. After seven months of abuse at ICC Marcia Lightner foflowed her husband to 
Orofino, when he was transferred out of ICC She rented a home and started 
School in Lewiston. This did not deter the prisons attempt to keep the Lightners 
separated. This time they moved William to a county jail at the other side of the State 
in Idaho Falls ID. That act caused another 11 months of separation before William 
was eventually moved back to ICIO. 
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32. For eleven ( I 1 )  years, State prison officials have hw~fiied and allempted to 
sepwate the Li&tner%. This has caused menla1 tomlent, anguish, and depression, not 
to mention the cost involved. 
Ma-cia tightner poses no secwrity risk. It is simply hamsment to now again 
suspend her visits in t k  izme of security, from an alleged incident that was not even 
at or comected to the prisan, 
The Lightners assert that their visitation was suspended for reasons other than 
Macia" priding charge. That being, retaliation against the Lightners because they 
exercised their fundamental rights perfected by the Constitution to address other 
issues they have pending in the courts. 
35. The 1 4th hendmen t  states in part "nor shoil any Sfore deprive any person of 
'lifi ,  liher~j, or properg), ~ l i f h  out dzreproce.ss oflar~. " The Petitioners claim that 
Marcia's visitation in liberty interest was interfered with by ISCI officials with out 
due Process, and the Petitioners loss of ConsorCiw was being done in retaliation. 
Cunquently, this imposes a typical and sigrlifioant hardship on the Lightner's 
Marriage in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. 
CAUSE OF ACTION CLAIM 111 
36. Claim three (3) is also a violation of Idaho State Constitution Article 13. It 
States "No person shall be twice put in jeopar&for the same oflence " The Lightners 
visits were suspended for four (4) months in April for Marcia's arrest. To now 
suspend them again for the same arrest is Double Jeopardy. 
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SUPPORTING FACTS 
37. The Lightner's were denied visiting h r n  12 April, 2007 until 20 July, 2007 
due to Marcia's 10 April 2007 mest. Then denied again on 1 October 2007 until this 
present date. 
38. A&er having missed 4 1 visits. Marcia appealed the legality of the suspension 
to Waden h d y  Blades. Warden Blades, after concern and reconsideration, 
reinstated their visiting privileges and Marcia was notified by telephone from Jeff 
Kirkman. that she could resume her visiting with her husband with no restrictions. 
JeRKirkrnan mentioned that she would need to keep him up to date of any changes in 
her case. hdarcia Lightner did as he asked. 
39. Upon replacing Randy Blades as waden, John Hardison again suspended 
Lightners visits for the same April incident. Having iost visiting privileges once 
without due process was bad enough but to now lose them a second time for the same 
offence is Double Jeopardy. 
P ~ V I O U S  LAWSUITS AND ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF 
The Lightners have sought informal relief from the appropriate administrative 
Officials by talking personally, and on the phone to Prison officials when their visits 
Were Suspended. Marcia tightner did contact the IDOC for relief with the violation 
and was refused and turned away with no resolution to the issues of her concerns. 
She was just told that her Rights did not matter to them, 
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41, As ofthe suspnsion inflicted by Warden 13ardison 1 October 2007 the 
PlaintiRs have exhausted the prison grievance system and m&ing appeals 
with the Corporate IDOC offices. No relief was given. (see atkhed grievmces) 
42. M e n  all effbrts failed to get the visiting reinstated, The Li&;tners filed a tort 
claim at the Seerew of State" Office, and then this civil action, 
43. Plaintis demand trial by jury. 
-PUYER FOR =LIEF- 
Plaintiffs Pray the Court. to: 
(a) Accept Jurisdie~on of the case; 
(b) That the Court order: 
1. Steve Nelson, $20,000 plus additional $2500.00 per visit, to be calculated per 
total loss up to the time the visits are reinstated. 
2 .  John Hardison, $50,000.00 plus additional $5000. 00 per visit, to be calculated 
per total loss up to the time the visits are reinstated. 
3. Director Renke, $50,000.00 plus additiow~$5000.00 per visit, to be 
calculated per total loss up to the time visits are reinstated. 
(c) That while incarcerated, the Court orders William Lightner MI438 will not be moved 
from his current housing assignment. If he is again moved, it would have to be taken as a 
serious form 
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of realiation do to filing of this law suit. Willim Li&tncr safe md doing fine 
at his cunent housing at ISGI. ( Although this mended cornplaint mentions that Willim 
Lightner not be moved, The IDOC has moved him, in April 2008, and He does take this 
as a retaliatory action because of filing this law suit.) 
(d) That the Court order the Lighmers receive normal visiting privilege equal to, 
other visitors and with out hzssment and rettlliation. And that to deny visiting wi&out 
just cause would be considered a contempt of court. 
(e) That the Court order the IDOC to change their visiting Policy and Procedures so 
that they reflect Constitutional standards. 
(f) That the Court order defendants to pay all courts costs and fees in this case and 
attorneys fees if counsel makes an appearance; 
(g) h p h i n g  else the Court feels the Lightners are due or entitled to. 
(h) Finally, that these issues be heard and determined by a jury. 
/ 
Dated this / day of June 2008 
Dated this & day of June 2008 
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R, XSB #3X89 
Lead Depuv, Coae~hons Section 
NO. 
A.M 
A, INS=, BE3 #5275 
Deputy Aaomey Gmeral 
Idaho Depament of Correc.rion 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 1 10 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone (208) 658-2087 
Pacsirnile: (208) 327-7485 
Anomeys for DefendaaG 
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Come Now Defendants, by and through undersigned counsel and hereby answer 
and respond to RlaintifPs Amended Civil Rights Complaint ("'Amended Complaint") on 
file in this action: Defendants deny each and every allegation in Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint, unless specidcally and expressly admitted herein. 
1. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 1. 
2, Answexing the allepdons c o n ~ n e d  inParagraph 2, Befendants lack 
s&icient knowledge or infomation mcessary to form a belief as to the tmth of the 
maMers asserted, and therefore presently deny the same. 
3. h w & g  the allegations contain& in Paragaph 3, Det'endants admit that 
Defendmt b h k e  is the Director of the XZ)OC and to the extent be was acting within the 
course and scope of bis employment, he was acting unda color of state law. 
4. Answering the allegations conwed in Paragaph 4, Defendmts admit that 
Defendant Hardison i s  the Warden at ISCl and to the extent he was actkg wit& the 
course and scope of his employmen& he was acting under color of state law. Defendants 
W e r  adonit that as Wsden, Defenant Hadson is the mpervisor of ISCI stafT; 
however, Defendants deny any characterization or implication that by virtue of his 
position Defendant Hardison is vicariously liable for any alleged conduct of his staff. 
5.  Answering the allegations contained in Paragaph 5, Defendants deny the 
first sentence tl~tile/reof With respect to the remainhg allegations, Defendants lack 
sufficient knowledge or infonaation necessary to form a belief as to the truth of the 
rnatte~s asserted, and therefore presentfy deny the same. 
6. Answering the allegations contained in the Paragraph labeled 
"Jurisctiction,'~efendants admit the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S .C. 1983; 
however, Defendants deny that Idaho Code 5-201 provides a basis for jurisdiction, 
'7. Answering the alIegations contained in Paragraph 1 0, Defendants lack 
sufficient kaowledge or idomation necessary to f o m  a belief as to the truth of the 
matters asserted, and therefore presently deny the same. 
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8 h w e r h g  the crllega~ons contained in Paragraph 1 1, Defend=& admit 
Pfai9tZfMarcia Li&her was mested on or about April 10,2007. Mi& respect lo the 
remanmg dlegations, however, Befendme lack sufficient howledge or in-formation 
necessav to fom a belief as to the mth  ofthe- maeers asserted, and &erefore presently 
deny the s m e .  
9. h w e r i n g  the dlegations contained in P m m p h  12, Defendants admit 
only that on or about April 12,2007, PlairtmMzcia Li&ker% visitation privileges 
were suspended. 
10. h w e r h g  the allegalions contded in Paramph 13, Defendants admit 
only that after appro ly thee  months of suspmion, Plain~ff Marcia Lightner's 
visitation privileges were reinstated. Defmdanb deny all remaining allegations 
conuked in this paranaph. 
1 1. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph 14, Defendants admit 
only that on or about October 1,2007, Plaintiff Marcia Lightner's visitation privileges 
were suspended. With respect to the remking allegations, Defendants lack sufficient 
knowledge or infomation necessary to f o m  a belief as to the truth of the matters 
~tsserted, and therefore presently deny the same. 
12. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 15. 
13. Answertjlg the allegations contained in Paragraphs 16 and 17, Defendants 
laok sufficient howledge or infomation necessary to form a belief as to the truth of the 
matters asserted, and &erefare presently deny the same. 
24. Defendants deny the alXegations contained in Paragraph 18. 
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15. h s u r e ~ n g  &e a l lega~o~s  contab4  in in~aragaph 19, Defend=@ lack 
sugicient knowledge or kfomation necessary to fom a belief as to the huth o f  the 
matters asserted, asld .t%lerefore presen.tfy deny the same. 
1 6. Defadaats deny the allega~ons contained in Paragaph 1 5 [20] and 16 
[2Xl. 
17. Defendmts admit tbe allegations conbhed in Paragap'h 17 [22]. 
18. Defendants deny the alle~fions contained in Paragraphs 18 [23], 19 [243, 
20 [25j, and 21 [26]. 
19. Answering the allegations conkind in Paraaaph 22 [27], Defendants 
admit the allegations contained in the %st sentence thereof, DefendmW deny all 
remaining allegations contained in this paragraph, 
20. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraphs 23 [28] and 24 
[291. 
21. hswenng the allegations contained in Paragraph 25 [30], Defendants 
admit only that PlaintiEs were not given a bearing prior to suspension of Plaintiff Marcia 
Li&tner's visitation privileges, Defendants deny all rmaining allegations contained in 
this paraaaph, specihcally including any chmcterization or implication that Plaintiffs 
had a due process right in their visiting privileges. 
22. Defendants deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 [3 11. 
23. Answering the allegations contained in Paragraph 27 [32], Defendants 
admit only that Plaintiff Marcia Lightner previously worked for an DOC contract 
vendor. With respect to the remaining allegations, howeke< Defendants lack sufficient 
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knowledge or igfomtion necessa;ry to fern a belief as to the mfi of the matters 
asserted, and &erefore presently deny the sme.  
24. Befendaats deny the d lega~om conhined in Paragaph, 28 [33 1. 
25. Answerhg the aIlega~ons contained in Paragraph 29 [34], Defendants 
lack sufficient bowledge or Momation necessary to form a belief as to the tmt?.~ of the 
matters asserted, mci &mefare presently deny the s m e ,  
26. Defenrlants deny the allega2ions conained in Paragraph 30 [35]. 
27. Answering the allega~ons conbhed in Paragaph. 3 1 [36], with respect to 
the first sentence, Defenhts  lack sufficient knowledge or infomation necessary to form 
a belief as to the truth of the ma~em asserted, and therefoxe presenay deny the same. 
Defenbts  deny all m m a i ~ g  dlegations conhhed in this parapph. 
28. Defendmts deny the allega.tions contained in Paragraphs 32 [37], 33 [38], 
34 [39J, 35 [40] and 36 f4.11. 
29. Answehg the allega~ons contained in Paragraph 37 [42], DefendaaQ 
admit the allegations contained in the first sentence thereof, Defendants deny all 
remaining allegations c o n b e d  in this paragraph. 
30: Answering the allegations conQined in Paragraph 38 [43], Defendants 
admit only that Warden Blades tmporarily reinstated PIaintiffs' visiting privileges. 
Defendants deny all remaining allegations contained in this paragraph. 
3 1.  hswenjy: the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 [44], Defendants 
admit only that PlaintiBs' visiting privileges were suspended by Defendant Hardison. 
Defendants deny all remainhg allegations contained in this paragraph. 
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32, Answaing the allegations coIxr&ed in Paramph 40 c4.53, Defendants 
a d ~ t  only that Plainties had some conlact with D O C  oEciaXs xegar&g their visitation 
privileges; however, Defendants d e ~ y  any cbaacterimtion or implica~on that Plaintiffs 
have exhallstad the adas t r a t i ve  grievance process. 
3 3, Defeadmts deny the a l lem~om contained in P a a p p h  4 1 [46]. 
34. Answering the alle~tr'ons contained in Paragraph 42 [47], Defendants 
admit only that Plaintiffs filed a notice of tort claim prior to filing this action. 
35. A n s w e ~ g  the allegations contained in Paragaph 43 [48], Defendaiits 
achowledge that IPfahWs have demanded a jury trial, 
36. Aaswkng the allegations contained in the Paragraph labeled ""Prayer for 
Relief,'~Dentlmts deny all allegations contained in subparagraphs (a) though @) 
thereof. 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Defendan@ have not been able to engage in sufficient discovery necessary to 
learn all of the facts and oircumstances relating to the matters described in Plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint and therefore request the COW to permit Defendants to amend their 
Answer and assert additional affmative defenses or abandon a m a t i v e  defenses once 
discovery has been completed. 
3ECOND DEFENSE 
That Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint fails to state a cause o f  action against the 
Defendants upon which relief can be granted and should therefore be dismissed pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DEFENSE 
That the allegations contained in the Pl~ntiBs%ended Co~nplaint do not rise to 
the level of a depl^ivation of rights that are protected by the Constihr~an or any of the 
legs1 provisions ref"erred to in the P l a h ~ E s m e n d e d  Complainl, 
That Defendants acted in a reasonable and prudent fmhion satisQing any d ~ ~ t y ,  if 
any, "chat they owed under Lhe rules, ree;ulations, satutes, ordhances, customs, policies 
and usages the State of Idaho m#or the United States of America. 
FIBTB[ DEFENSE 
That Defendmts are b u n e  from 1iabiE~ because the acts or omissions 
coqlained of, if any, were done by DefeadmQ in good faith, with hhoncst, reasonable 
belief that such actions were necessary and l a f i f .  at the time they occurxed. 
SIXTH DEPENSE 
That Defendants are h u e ,  or have qualified imunity., to the allegations 
contained in the Plaintiffs' Arnmded Complaint. 
SIEWWH DEFENSE 
A11 general h ~ t i e s  statutory or otherwise applicable. 
EIGHTH DEPENSE 
Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the available adrninistfative remedies, and 
oaerxrise failed to comply with available administrative remedies. 
To the extent that the Plaintiffs are asserting state law clahs, the liability, if any, 
of  Defendants for any state law claims or causes of action is limited pursuant to the 
provisions of the Td&o Tort C X ~ m  Act, In assehng this defense, Defendmts are in no 
way conceding ox a d d ~ g  Iiabilily. 
To the extent that the P f h H f s  are a s s e ~ g  state law claims against: Defendmts, 
some or all af such clGm are basred since they arise out of andlor stem Erom activities 
for which Defenbts  i lre -me from liability by virtue of the provisions of the Idaho 
Tort Claims Act, 
ELEVENTH DEFENSE 
To the extent that the P l ah~f f s  are asserting state law claims against Defendants, 
some or all of such claims axe barred by fhe failure of the PlaintifFs to comply with the 
Idaho Tort Claians Act. 
TWELFTH DEFENSE 
That Defendants are not liable in litigation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 9 1983, for any 
injury caused by the act or omission of another person under the theory of rapondeat 
superior. 
THIRTEENTH DEFENSE 
That the claims and damages set forth in the Plaia.tiffsY Amended Complaint are 
barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
FOmmENTB DEFENSE 
. That Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the bonding requirement set forth in 
Idaho Code 5 6-61 0, 
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n a t  some or all of P I a k ~ f f s k I a h s  for declacratoy aad injunctive relief are 
moot. 
That PlaktifiEs have f ~ l e d  to  tig gate tlxeleir dmlages, if my. 
R a E  11 
PlaktiEs' clainls are brou&t f~volously itnd weasonably and are not well 
grounded in fact or law and Defendan@ are entitled to sanctions against Plahtiffs 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Federal Rules o f  Civil Procedure. 
JURY DE- 
Defendants, p m a n t  to Rule 38@) of t.he Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby 
demands a trial by jury. 
AnO-Y FEES 
Defendants have been required to retain attorneys in order to defend this action 
and are entitled to rwover reasonable attorney fees pursuaat to federal and state law and 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WBNFORE, Defendants pray for judgment against the Plaintiff as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and 
that the Plainties take nothing thereunder. 
2. That the Defendants be awarded their costs, izlcluding reasonable 
attorneys' fees pursuant to state and federal law, including 42 U.S.C. tj 1988, Idaho Code 
$8 6-91 8A, 12-1 17, 12-121, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. That judgment be entered in favor of Defendants on all claims for relief. 
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4, For such other and er relief as the Court deems just &nd equitable 
Respectfully submiaed this / %ay of July, 2008. 
STATE OF DAHO 
OFFICE OF' TI332 ATT 
Deputy Attorney General, 
Counsel for Defendmts 
CERTmlCAm OF SERVICE 
1 IXEZWBY c jeRmY that on the / &day of July, 2008,1 caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWR TO AMEmED C O M P L W  AND 
JURY DEMA.ND on: 
Willi~m LifShtner, # 41 438 
Idalxo Conectiond Center 
P.O. Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
Via Prisan Mail *stem 
AND 
Marcia LighWr 
300 E. 41" Street 
Garden City, ID 83714 
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WILLIAM LIGHWER MI438 
1CG WIT-C 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707 
1A LlGHmER 
G-EN CITY, IDAHO 83714 
PLAMTIFFS PRO, SE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURm JUDICLAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WILLIAM LlGHTNER , MARCLA LIGHINER 1 Case No. CV OG 07- 20193 
1 
Plaintiffs, mSPONSIE AND OBJECTION TO 
1 STATES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
1 SODGMENT W T H  MFmAVITS 
-vs.- ) IN SUPPORT 
1 




COMES NOW, Willianz and Marcia Lightner, Plaintiffs Pro se, hereby submits their ''RESPONSE 
AND OBJECTION TO STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT." Based on the reasons stated 
below, Plaintiffs request that the court denies the Motion for S w  Judgment, and this case proceed to trial. 
I. LNTRODUCTION 
This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff William Lightner is an Idaho State 
prisoner. Plaintiff Marcia Lightner is his wife. Plaintiffs (William and Marcia) claim that their constitutional 
rights were violated when ldaho Department of Correction (IDOC) officials terminated Marcia's visiting 
privileges without Due Process of Law, and then violated the Double Jeopardy clause, by suspending the 
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY .JUDGMENT-I- 
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Li&tners visibtion a second time far the orighal oEence. 
11. STATEmm OF FACTS 
1. William is an IDOC prisoner who was housed at the Idaho State Comectional Institution (ISCI) 
hou&out the time frme of this claim. (See PlaintiEs%Edav=1.ls in Suppo&). 
2. Marcia was a regular visitor, visiting her husbad, Willim three (3) times a week allowed and approved 
by ZSCI. (See Ex4libit H of Hardison's AAFibvit for a copy of Marcia's visiting log). 
3. On 10 April 2006 Marcia was arrested at her home and released from custody on 11 April 2006. 
subsequent to that arrest, Warden Blades and Deputy Warden Christensen, suspended Marcia's visiting 
privileges. 
4. Afler three months of suspended visits, and personal c o m ~ c a t i o n  between Marcia and k d e n  
Blades, PlgntiRs visits were reinstated by warden Blades in July 2007. 
5. Around October 2007, 'Warden Hardison had replaced Warden Blades as warden at ISCI. On 1 October 
2007 Warden Hardison suspended Marcia's visit's a second time for her April arrest, even when requested, a 
due process hearing was denied regarding the loss of privileges. (See attachment-A, Oet. 1,2007 
correspondence fiom Hardison terminating visitation). 
HI SUMmRY JUDGMIENT STANDARD 
6. Under the Idaho Rules of Procedure, Summary Judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a mater of law. I.R.C.P. 56 (c); Student Loan 
Fund v. Duerner, 13 1 Idaho 45,49,95 1 P. 2d. 1272 (1998). The burden falls in the moving party to prove the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. U.D.A.R.. Inc v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141,143-44,997 
P. 2d 602 (2000). 
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I V  ARGUMENT 
A. Deferzliant argues i h t  GYilliam k claim is :burred due to hisfuilure to exhaust the IDOC 
I ,  grievuuce process. 
6. ISGl has a gievaulce procedme, This procedure is contajned in IDOC Division of Prisons Staniiard 
Opemting Procedme 3 16.02.0 1 .OO 1 (SOP 3 16). The complete ~ e v a n c e  procedwe consists of three steps. 
a) Using a 'Toncem form" to seek out an informal resolution with the staff member closest to the 
incident. 
b) Complete a ""Grievance fom"if informal resolution can not be accomplished between the involved 
parties. 
In most instances, Concern forms are sent to various ConeclJonal officers (CO's) or various prison areas 
(Comissary, Laundry etc). A grievance on the other hand adds a reply f?om a Sgt. or Lt. and then is either 
"Granted or '*Modified, by a reviewing authority such as the deputy warden. 
c) An "Appeal" to the grievance response to the "Appellate Authority" who is typically the head of the 
facility, generally referred to as "'Warden'bho makes the final ruling as the chief appellate authority. 
7. In this instance there was no grievance procedure possible. The person most closely related to the 
incident where the initial concern would be sent, is the same person as the final "Appellate Authority" who was 
available at ISCl to appeal the Warden's decision to? (See William Lightner's Affidavit in Support) 
8. Even if Plaintiff had not pursued the grievance process, S m a r y  Judgment should not be granted, 
because there are disputed issues of material facts involved that preclude sumxnary judgment. In the case of 
Harris v.Ford, 32 F. Supp 2d 1109 (D. AK 1999) the court held that where the claim did not relate to prison 
conditions, the PLRA exhaustion was not required prior to filing a lawsuit. The court ruled that a court's duty to 
screen prisoner complaints does not require it to do such screening in writing to the defenbts,  and that the 
prisoner was not required to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA because his claims did not 
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relate to prison eon&tions. 
9. In this case the is true. Plain~Es are not mmplaining abaut prison conditions. They are 
chdlenging the constitu~onal egality of the IDOC Policy md Proceduse, and claiming that their constimtional 
rights were violated due to then questionable Policies. 
10. F d e m o r e ,  the in-house gfievance process could not possibly challenge the validity of IDOC Policy 
and Procedure, nor deternine if Com~wtional ri&ts were violated. This is because there are no impartial 
reviews of the Mevances by non-IDOG officials. A blue-shield has been implemented by the defendants that 
prevent a close inspt ion of any regulation review.( See PlainiiEsm&vi& in S u p p ~ ) .  
11.  In the defendauts motion for s m a y  judment they list a n m k r  of cases in which summary judment 
was granted for lack of exhaustion of a grievance process, yet as they would attempt to lead the court to believe, 
this is NOT always the case, 
12. The disirict court dismissed a claim of d e a l t h y  air in a prison for failure to exhaust remedies, Bishop 
v. Lewis 155 F. 3d 1094 (9th cir. 1998). Appellate court reversed and remanded, finding that the PLRA 
exhauslion of adminish.ative remedies provision did not apply retroactively, and found that the prisoner 
substantially complied with court order to exhaust internal prison remedies. 
13. Mitchell v. Shomig, 969 F. Supp. 487 Q4.D. IL, 1997): The Court found that cell temperatures ranging 
from 32" to 50° for extended periods of time violated the Eight Amendment, and the court reksed to apply the 
exhaustion of administrative remedies imposed by the PLRA. 
14. Miller v. Thombwh, 755 F. Supp 980 (D.Ks 1991): The court held that Habeas Corpus petitioner did 
not have to exhaust all available administrative remedies as such remedies exhausted only where issues 
involving control and management of a prison were involved, but petitioner was challenging the underlying 
Constitutional validity of the basis for his transfer and incarceration in another prison. 
15. Since the current claim originated actions of the ISCI warden, there was no ISCI grievance process 
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suswnded the visits, Beings W ~ d e n  Hardimn is comidered the &evanee proeess, a d  he bad d r e d y  
made the decision to suspend the visits, there was no f d e r  ~ e v m m  left for WiHiam to do. (See PlaintiNFs" 
Asdavit in Suppa). 
20. Director Rei&e was: 
a) aware of the nature of the Li&her% claims 
b) wa9 idam4 of the issues and concerns. 
c) hari the power as an appellate authority to review the claim. 
However, Reinke chose to do nothing. 
21. As the IDOC Director, it is Reinke's job and responsibility to be an appellant authority on issues 
involving insrihirional wardens. Rehke's actions were done deliberately so as to not make him criminally 
negligent and nor show deliberate indifference. 
22. In McDade v. West, 223 F. 3d 1135, 1140 (9h cir.2000): The court held that the employee acted under 
State law for 1983 p w s e s  "she invoked the power of her office to accomplish the offensive act. Therefore, 
however improper Ms. West's actions were, they clearly related to the perfbmance of her official duties. 
23. When Mr. Reinke refused to meet with Marcia, he invoked the power of his office staff to "Get rid of 
her" clearly shirking the performance of his official duty. A Director of a governmental agency should always 
be willing to review any and all issues that he or she is in control of in order to become aware of any unethical 
or constitutional behavior or abuse of Policy and procedure he or she is directed to uphold according to law. 
(See Plaintiffs' Affidavits In Support). 
24. Kimes v. Stone, 84 F. 3d 1121, 1127 (9& cir. 1996): The Court held that "conduct by persons acting 
under color of state law which is wrongfdly under 42 USC 1983 ... Cannot be immunized by State law. .. and 
the summary judgment clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced." To not 
include Director Reinke as a defendant due to his willful ignoring the claim would be clearly contrary to the 
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htent of 1983, which is to enable a p m n  deprivd of &eir civil rights "to rmver  M1 eompeMion from the 
g o v e m e n a  officids respmible for those deprivadons." Gmes, Id. 
25. 1 12 SGT 1827 (1 992): The se of 1983 is to deter State actors fLom using the badge 
of their au&ority to dep~ve  individds of their fededly guaranteed md constitutionally protected rights and 
privileges and to provide relief to v i e h s .  
26. PlaintiEs claim that their Com~t t r t iod  Ri&& were violated when they were denied a due process 
hearing, and for the claim of double jeopardy. Plaintiff Marcia Lightner specificdly stated to the head of IDOC 
J e E W u t a ,  officer representing d e f e n b t  Reide, that the prison directives of Policy and Procedures were 
unconslihtiod by not including due process procedures. (See Narcia Lightner's Affidavit In Support). 
27. Defendmt Reinke is liable since he is the convening authority, is responsible for the actions of 'Wasden 
under his control, and for the preparation of Policies and Procedures given to the institutions. Mr. Reinke holds 
a position to assist and assert change under his direction and discretion if change is necessary to assist that 
institutional integrity and to protect State law. (See William Lightner's Affidavit In Support). 
C. The denial of Mrs. L igher  k visiting privileges violated her Constitutional Rights. 
28. Walker v. S m e r ,  14 F. 3d 141 5 (9& cir. 1994): Facts as to whether inmate was denied right to produce 
witnesses in his defense at a DOR proceeding violated due process and precludes summary judgment. 
29. Nationwide, it has been clearly established that inmates convicted of prison offences are entitled to due 
process hearings. The Constitution guarantees that a person is entitled to due process before punishment is to be 
administered. Plajntigs were denied this fundamental right. Plaintiff Marcia Lightner was punished prior to 
ever being convicted of any wrongdoing, which flies in the face of the "innocent until proven guilty" standard 
our laws are based upon. (See Marcia Lightner's Asdavit In Support). 
30. Plaintiffs claim that the loss of visitation privileges is punishment, As such, requires a due process 
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h ~ n g .  Also that lDOC visihg Policies are unmmtibtiond for not including due p r m s  pprocedures as 
required by Izatt v. Anderson, U.S. District Court St-ipdated Apement  c o n e ~ n g  visibtion t e ~ n a l j o n  
procedwes . 
3 1. If h a t e s  afe enlitled to due process for prison rule viola~on and have lost many of their rights, how 
much more shodd Marcia Li&tner be entitled to due process before being p ~ s h e d  with loss of privileges. 
32. In anoher case dealing with the liberty interest of visitation issues, the court ruled that in order to create 
a protmed liberty interest in the prison context, state redations must use explicitly mandatory lmgmge in 
connection with the eshblishent of specific subsmtive predicates to "Limit OEcial Discretion", there by 
requiring that a particular outcome be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria was met. See Kentucky 
DOC v. Thompson, 490 US 454 ( 1  989). See also Smith v. Couahlin, 748 F. 2d 783 (2nd cir. 1984). 
33. A prison regulation may infringe or threaten a constimtiond interest, as applied to a particulas protected 
expression, if the regulation is legitimately related to pendogical goals or interests, but the court must balance 
the importance of the prisoners f i n g e d  right against the importance of penalogical interest and inquire 
whether the rule is an exaggemted response. Murphy v. Shaw, 195 F. 3d 1 12 I (9*b cir. 1999). 
34. It is clear that Warden Blades had no problem complying with the law, and it is obvious that Defendant 
Hardison's temimtion of Marcia Lightner's visits was an exaggerated response, or at the least a power-trip 
Defendant Hardison felt like enjoying. (See Plaintiffs'AAftTidavit in Support). 
35. According to defendants Motion for Surnmary Judgment, there was an excessive cost of manpower and 
prison recourses to allow continued visitation, yet a full-time hearing oAftTicer is on staff to afford other inmates 
their Due Process rights at DOR hearings. 
36. Plaintiffs had their visits suspended twice for the same alleged offence, and was deprived of liberty 
without due process which violates the First, Fifth and Fourteenth h e n h e n t s  to the U.S. Constiturion. (See 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits in Support). 
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-8- 000061 
37. Pl&nti@s were s o m e d  of waden's deeision to swpnd  visit-ation privileges but tlrere not conkonled 
with any w i ~ s e s  alleging some Ibrm of wongdoing agknst them, nor given the o p p & ~ t y  to present 
~;lnesses in their behalf, or given the opp&mity to have an impmid he review official to chdlenge 
Hardison's actions. (See Pl&ntiEs7 AE&vit in Suppr"l). 
38. To violate a pemon" sights and privileges and deny h w b a d  and wife visibtion without just cause, and 
without due process is cruel and unusud gunisbent in violation of rbe 8h Annex~hent. 
39. No State shall deprive any person of their liberty wifiout a due process of law as clearly held by the 
Amenbent, unless there is a clear penologcal reason. If there was a s e c ~ t y  concern, then obviously Blades 
felt it was very slight or he would not have reinsmed Plaintiffs' visit-ation. 
40. By abinistering pur?isbent in taking away Plaintiffs visiting ri&s and privileges twice of the same 
alleged oEence, and wiLhout a due process hearing, defendants violated Plaintiffis I", 5th, 8th, and 14'h 
Amenhent rights to the U.S. Constitution. 
41. Courts have ruled in prior cases that the termination of family visitation to inmates was unconstitutional. 
Laudter v. Kay,-986 F. Supp 1362 (D. UT 1997), and that due process is required in prison settings O ~ a s o  
v. Hey, 113 F. Supp 2d 405 (E. D. NY 2000), see also, Hardaway vb. Ken, 573 F. Supp 419 (W. D. WI 1983). 
D. In this case wendants  are not entitled to qualified immuni& 
42. "The substantial defense accorded prison officials does not relieve federal courts &om their duty to 
ensure that prison officials actions are not exaggerated responses to prison concern.. . (at 1200) and "Prison 
authorities cannot frame and then improperly discipline prisoners for exercising their constitutional rights." 
h e c h t  v. Collins, 903 F. Supp 1193 ( S.D. OH 1995). 
43. In the case of Cuthrie v. Darosa. 1998 WL 227 15, at 4 (ND CA 1998) the court held that Defendants 
must establish that the correctional action taken would have taken place regardless of prisoner's protected 
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conduct or that the reaiatory act w a  wly I%jlored to serve legitimte pedogical purpose. Momt Eledth~ 
,429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
44. The court a%md the Supreme Cow% decision that the Tumer standard applies to all Constitutional 
claims arising in prison with the exception of 8th h e n b e n t  claims. Ward v. W&b 1 F. 3d 873 (9* cir 1993). 
45. Knowing that even DOR pmeedings require a due process hearing, Defendants should have h o r n  
Plaintiffs were entitid to the right. The Court held in Johnson v. Goombe. 2001 WL 617539 (S.D. NY 
2001) That h a t e s  had a constitutional right to call ~Wesses,  who prison officials r e h e d  to call, and any 
reasonable person involved should have known about the right to call witnesses, the right to present evidence 
and the right to an impmid hearing examiner. Thus, the case should proceed and no qualified iinmunity should 
be available to the officials. (See Pl&ti@s9 Affidavit in Support). 
46. Officiais were denied qualified imrnunity in Verser v. Elvea. 1 13 F. Supp 2d 121 1 (N. D. IL 2000) 
because, ". . . a plaintiff need not use magic words like 'keckless" or "intentional" to make out a case for 
deliberate indiEerence. He must merely plead that the Defendant's behaved in a way that can be construed to 
show reckless or intentional conduct. 
47. When Plaintiff% requested for a due process hearing was denied, defendants willfklly and deliberately 
violated the plaintirs rights and "therefore is not entitled to immunity. 
48. "Clearly Established" does not mean that an official action is protected by qualified imrnunity unless the 
very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of preexisting law the 
d k m l n e s s  must be apparent. Wilson v. Lame, 526 US 603,609 (1999). What is "Clearly Established" is 
that the Constitution guarantees due process hearings. Ooly prison officials who have no knowledge are 
qualified to imrnunity Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F. 2d 500 (8" cir. 1990). 
49. Cause of Action claim I1 of Plaintiffs suit was for retaliation. In the case of Bloch v, Ribar, 156 F. 3d 673 
(6th cir. 1998) it is clearly established that qualified immunity is inapplicable for retaliation claims. (See 
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50. In 153 F. 36 564 (7" cir- 1 998) oficids  we^ aat en~tlcxf to qualified 
h m e t y  becaw execu~ve abuse of power uSh0ckd the &mien== in that case, the d e ~ n e  was denied 
access to courts for 57 days. In this however, &fendan& iatent was to deny due p pmmently. 
Defendm& willingly and ho*gly violat4 Pl&n&Rs ti* 148 F. 3d 103 1 (8"h cir. 1998). 
5 1. Under Sate law, an oficial and the entity that employs the oficia) may be liable for unla*l acts if the 
officials know that the act is d a d 1  or if there is some notice sufficient to put him, as a remnable man, under 
duty to investigate the conduct in question. PiaintiEs pemndly tried to make contact with the Director in order 
to discuss with ofEcials of the error and unl act, but Defendants failed to correct the &awful act, m&ng 
them liable for damages. Martinez v. Citcv of Las Angeles, 141 F. 3d 1373 (9& cir. 1998). Lucas v. Parish of 
Jefferson, 999 F. Supp 839 (E. D. LA 1998). Taylor v. Sullivm, 980 F. Supp 697 (S.D. NY 1997). Dennis v. 
Thurman, 959 F. Supp 1253 (G. D. CA f 997). 
52. PlaintiBs have claimed that the ISCI Policy of not giving a due process hearing violated their rights. In 
Willims v. Greifinner, 97 F. 3d 699 (ZA cir n 1996) "Reasonable Belief" by Defendants that challenged policy 
did not violate inmates rights does not provide a qualified &unity defense. 
53. The case of Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F 36 434 (gth cir, 1996) fits the Plaintiffs current case, 
whether a governmental offrcial is entitled to qualified immunity turns on a two part inquiry, one of which 
states: 
a) Was the law governing the officials conduct clearly established? 
'I'he right of due process is so clearly established that it is included in multiple Amendments of the Bill 
for Rights. Another claim of the Plaintiffs is that of Double Jeopardy, another well established claim. 
Defendant Hardison knew that Plaintiffs visits had already been suspended, and knew he was suspending them 
again for a second time without legitimate penalogical foundation. He also knew that he made the decision and 
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carried &ou& without f l o r h g  PlajntiEs the right to due process. 
54. The 1.D.O.C. takes the position that h a i n @  of any due process are not given when there are concerns 
of ktitutiond secusif;y. However, the Pl&~-Ffs contend that the US Consti~tion provides Due Prwess above 
and beyond any other State Policy and Procedure. A person is imment until fowid guilty, and just because 
Marcia Li@tner was c h g e d  with a felony, she was not convicted of me, neither at the t h e  of the visiting 
suspension or at the conclusion of her case. (See Marcia Li&ber's Affidavit In Support). 
55. The defenhts  ornit a vital point that the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Jones v. Bock, 127 SCT 910 
(2007). The Supreme Court stated that the prisons grievance system could be such as to "rip7' up the prisoner 
while they are trying to pursue the grievance process. This is true here as the grievance procedures do not 
explain how one is to grieve an action made by the highest grievance appellate authoriq. There is no oversight 
review of the warden's actions that are available to the Plaintiffs. (See PlaintifEs' Affidavits in Support). 
E. Pluintzrs are not ulleging a "respondent superior" argument: 
56. Defenhts  argue that Plaintiffs are raising a "respondeat superior" claim. (Page-9 of Defendants' 
Memorandum). This is simply untrue. Plaintiffs are claiming that Re&e is the supervising authority over the 
other defendants, and as such knew or should have known that Hardison's actions violated Plaintiffs' rights but 
failed to make a policy change or take other actions to prevent the foreseeable violations. See &>one v. Elrod, 
706 F.Supp. 636,638 (N.D. 111.1989); Strachan v. Ashe, 548 F.Supp. 1 193,1204 (D. Mass. 1982). 
57. Plaintiffs are raising a "Supervisor Liability" claim because the evidence herein clearly establishes a 
strong inference that Reinke knew of the lower officials' unlawful actions and willfully failed to intervene to 
prevent or correct the unlawful acts. (See Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support). 
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I;: The policies as applied to Plaint~xs was an =agerated respome: 
58. PIabtiEs agree that prison officials have wide latitude in creating regulations gove&ng visitation. 
However, the regulations 1 .) must be evenly enforced a d  not upon the w b s  of an officials pemonal 
beliefs; 2.) clearly wriaen so that the prisoner usldersmds the remlal-ions; and 3.) the regulation cannot be used 
as an exaggerated response to some minor or none existent %ion. 
59. Defendmt Hardison applied the visiting policy in an exaggerate& m m e r  when he over-road Waden 
Blades7 reinstatement of Plaintiffs' visiting. Such exaggerated response has been held mconstitutian;xl in 
Hargis v. Foster, 312 F3d 404 (9" Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs had been visiting for many month prior to Nardison 
taking over the Warden position, vvithout incident warranting termination of the visits. (See Plaintiffs' Affidavit 
in Support). 
60. The Defendants' reliance upon Ove.rt.on v. Buet ta ,  539 US 126 (2003) is not applicable as there is no 
dispute that they may create reasonable regulations governing visitation. 
G. Hardison and Reink do not huve qudified immunify; 
6 1. Hardison cannot claim he did not know that Blades had reinstated PlaintiE's visits after a thorough 
review of the facts behind the initial termination of Plaintiffs' visits. Once Plaintiffs' visits were reinstated all of 
Plaintiffs' rights to the liberty interest in visitation kicked into play, and Hardison's termination of the visits after 
his taking over as Warden was an exaggerated response without legitimate penological concerns. Hargis, supra. 
(See Plaintiffs'Affidavit in Support). 
62. The prison officials can be held liable for money damages if the conduct violated "clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
US 635,639 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 US 800,818 (1982); Vaurrhn v. Ricketts, 859 F2d 736 (9" Cir. 
1988); Kelly v. Borg, 60 F3d 664,666 (9& Cir. 1995); Newel1 v. Sauser, 79 F3d 1 15,117 (9& Cir. 1996); 
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Osolimki v. Kme, 92 FJd 934 (!Igh Gir. 1996); supm at pgph. 50 iibove. 
63. Also, as a maaer of law, a Court that deternines wheher defenhts  can rely on qualified h m i t y  
should consider dl relevmt legal precedent, not just those cases cited by the parties. Elder v. Hollowav, 11 4 
SCT 1019 (1994). 
H. PPlaitzYMarcia Lightner 's cornortiam claim is not homed; 
64. Defendants p rema~e ly  argue that Plaintiff Willim Lightner has failed to exhaust his grievances which 
in turn causes Mrs. Lighmr's consortim claim to be barred. As Plaintiffs pointed out above, Plaintiffs pursued 
every possible e h m t i o n  where available. The Defendants have the burden of "proving that there is an 
inisbative process that would be able to take action in response to [the specific] complaht-action, that is, 
other than saying, 'Sorry, we can't do anything about it."' Rahirn v. Sheaban, 2001 WL 1263493 at *6-7 and n.3 
(N.D. 111. Oct. 19,2001); Marvin v. Goord, 255 F3d 40'43 (2d Cir. 2001). 
65. It's been held that Courts should require substantiation that an administrative procedure on its face 
affords relief for a particular type of complaint before dismissing a prisoner's claim for non-exhaustion. See 
Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F3d 570,580 (7& Cir. 2005)(holding that prison oficials had not established an 
available remedy where nothing "clearly identifie[d]"how to chaflenge certain decisions). Nowhere in the 
regulations is there an available avenue to grieve warden Hardison's actions since he is the final appellate 
authority, leaving his action ungrievable. (See Plaintiffs' -davit in Support). 
66. Therefore, Plaintiff Marcia Lightner's consortium claim are still available and warrant consideration by 
both this court and the jury. (See Marcia Lightner's Asdavit in Support). 
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SUMTION 
67. PlajnriEs' First, Fi&, and Fourtan&, h e n h e n t s  ofthe US.  Cometuhon have k e n  violated by the 
IDQC officials without any remorse. Both Plaintiffs had our visits suspended twice without any due process 
based upon an alleged chage, in which the IDOC o a c i d s  toak no responsibili~ for their wrong doing. To 
continrtiilly de@ a person due process shows a lack of respect for the law of the land. To hold themselves above 
the law of the land displays comption in the body of the govement, which itself c d e s  the burden to stand 
for justice and integrity. W e n  integrily fails vvithin the system, the system does not stand a chance to correct 
itself. It and all within it will fails all those they are trying to correct kcause they do not set a good example for 
the very law they are trying to uphold. 
68. Plaintiffs have suffered injury and seek a remedy for those injuries. The Defendants have a history for 
continued harassment of Plaintiffs by repetitive tednation of visits. Continued discovery in this case will 
prove Plaintiffs' claims are valid and clearly supported. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, as  Pl&tiEs%ve clearly identified material issues of fact that preclude s w v  
judgment the DefendantsWotion should be denied and the case scheduled for jury trial. 
RespectfUlly Submiaed this $'- day of December, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that a (sue md correct copy of the foregokg MSPONSE AND OBJECTION 
TO STATESWOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITH WFIDA-TS IN SUPPORT was mailed 
to: 
Mmk Kubimb 
Deputy Aeomey General 
Defendants Counsel 
IDOG Suite 110 
1 299 N. orchard st, 
Boise, ID 8 3 7 v  
ystem, Dated ths ay of December, 2008. 
RESPONSE AND OBJECTION TO STATES MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-16- 
C L .  'BW(31" OITER BRENT REINKE 
Marcia Lightner 
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I have reviewed the circumstances surrounding your visiting privileges including 
the arrangement you had with Warden Blades. I regret to inform you that I am 
reversing the decision to allow you to continue to visit your husband pending the 
outcome of your pending criminal charges. 
My decision is based on what is clearly defined in visiting policy 604 that states: 
Termination of Visiting Privileges 
Visitation privileges may be terminated at the discretion of the facility head 
or designee for any length of time, including permanently, for violation or 
atiempted violation of any state or federal law, any Board rule, Policy and 
Procedure, SOP, field memoranda, or failure to follow staff instructions 
(emphasis added). 
The policy does allow for consideration on a case-by-case basis for immediate 
family of the offender with felony arrests within the iast five (5) years to be 
determined by the facility head. As the appellant authority I am denylng your 
visiting privileges effective immediately until the determination of your pending 
criminal charges. At that point I will reconsider your visiting application. 
Hardison, Warden 
Idaho State Correctional Institution 
Wjk 
Cc: DW Christensen; Sgt. McIntire 
LN THE DISTRLCT COURT OF THE FOURTH IUDIClAL 
THE STATE OF LDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 




JOHN HARDISON, BRENT REINKE, 
and STEVE NELSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOC-0720193 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The I 





In 1989, Marcia Lightner received a withheld judgment for an unknown charge. A@ Marcia I 
Court heard oral arguments on Monday, December 22, 2008. The Plaintiffs appeared pro se, Mrs. 
Lightner in person and Mr. Lightner telephonically from the Idaho Correctional Center. Mark 
Kubinski appeared for the Defendants. The Court took the matter under advisement at that time. For 
25 
2 6 
F/ r i  
Lightner, Exhibit A. While serving a prison sentence, William Lightner met Marcia, who was a 
00007 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page I 
1 
2 
11 Lightners objected to the form of the visitation granted. First Antended Civil Rights Complaint. 
contract vendor at the c o m i s s q  at the Idaho State Conectional Institute (ISGI). Civil Riglzts 
Complaint, 1 27. fn 1997, the couple married and Willim Lightner remained incarcerated. Civil 
4 
11 29. In 2000 or 2001, the Lightners received full visitation. First Amended Civil Rights Complairtt, 1 
I I 29. In 2005 William Lightner granted parole. Af John Hardison, 1 6; Exhibit D. While he was on 9  
"lo 
lo I1 parole, the Lightners lefl the country and took up residence in Belize. A@ Marcia Lightner, 7 6. 
Rights Cot~plaint, Ij 27. In 1998, Willim Lightner used the @evmce process in regard to visitation 
issues. A$$ Jill Whitlington, P/ 13. The Li&tners objected to the prison policy that denied visitation 
the couple. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, f j  29. Restricted visitation was granted and the 
11 1 1  On April 10, 2007, Marcia Lightner was arrested for the felony offense of harboring a felon I 
I' I /  2008, Marcia Lightner went to the Idaho State Correctional Institute and was informed that her 
1 2  
l3 
in violation of Idaho Code rj 18-205. Afl: Marcia Lightner, 7 5; A# Mark klubinski, Exhibit A. The 
following day she was released on bail. '48 Marcia Lightner, 7 5. Early in the morning on April 12, 
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
2 1  1 / failed to provide any other updates. A# Marcia Lightner, 7 18. I 
visitation was suspended as a result of her anest. A$ Marcia Lightner, 7 10. Subsequently, Marcia 
Lightner wrote to Warden Blades attempting to explain the circunstances of the event and pleading 
for reinstatement of visitation. AfJ: Marcia Lightner, Exhibit A. Warden Blades reinstated the 
1 9  
2 0  
Lightners' visitation on the condition that she keep the facility informed of the status of her case. 
Afl: Marcia Lightner, 7 16. Marcia Lightner contacted the staff in August 2007 with an update, but 
I I for violating the visitor contact rules at the beginning and conclusion of his visits with Marcia 2 5 
2  2 
2 3 
2 4 
The Lightners have a history of violating facility policies. On November 29, 2006, William 
Lightner accepted a visitation restriction when offered the choice of visitation restriction or a DOR 
2 6  000072 
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11 DOR for inappropriate goodbye. Id. On July 22, 2007, other visitors to the ldaho State Correctional 
hstitute complained that Marcia Lightner was changing the order of the visitors log and was 
dressed inappropriately for visiting, including sheer, revealing clothing and a lack of undergments. 
Id. On August 27, 2007, Marcia Lightner parked in an accessible space but failed to display her 
disabled identification permit. Id. M e n  reminded to be sure that her permit was displayed, Marcia 
Lightner exhibited hostility to the officer. Id. 
On October 1, 2007, Marcia Lightner was informed by telephone that visitation was 
1 2  1 1  meeting were made, Director Brent Reinke did not meet with Marcia Lightner regarding the I 
l o  
,, 
l3 1 visitation suspension. Afl Marcia Lightner 2.3. No internal jrievanees relating to visitation issues 
suspended because she was a security risk and that there was a possibility of reconsideration 
pending the outcome of her case. A&? Marcia Liglxtner, 7 21. Although requests for a personal 
l4 11 were filed by Williml Lightner between January 2007 and January 2001. // bN Wittingion 1 13. 
I I year probation sentence. Af Mark Kubinski, Exhibit A. The harboring a felon charge was dismissed 1 7  
15 
1 6  
l8 11 as part of the plea agreement. A .  Marcia Lightner, 7 5. The Lightners have had visitation since 
On March 31, 2008, Marcia Lightner pled guilty to obstructing justice and received a two 
l9 I1 June 13, 2008. '48 fohn Hardison, Exhibit H. To compensate for the period of separation, the 
20 
2 1  
Lightners seek an award of $120,000 and $12,500.00 per missed visit-a total of nearly $1.5 
million. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, 11. 
2 3 
2 4 
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
2 5 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
2 6 
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/I reveals that no disputed issues of material fact exist, then only a question of law remains. First Sec. 
B a ~ k  of Idaho, NA. v. Murpily, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). In a motion for 
summary judg~ent ,  all disputed facts are constsued liberally in favor of the non-moving party and 
all reasonable inferences drawn ftorn the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. 
See Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho 323, 324, 757 P.2d 186, 187 (1988); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 
/I party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits 
7 
8 
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 
21 1, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set 
forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. 
Id., I.R.C.P. 56(e). To withstand a motion for sunlmary judgment, the non-moving party's case must 
be anchored in soniething niore than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create 
a genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volksrvagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69 
(1 996). 
253, 255, 698 P.2d 3 15, 317 (1985). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that an adverse 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF WILLIAM LIGHTNER'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED ue TO HIS FAILURE TO 
I EXHAUST HE 1SCI GRIEVANCE PROCESS 
It is well established that a prisoner may not bring an action with respect to conditions of 
confinement without first exhausting available administrative remedies. Idaho Code 19-4206; 42 
22 1 1  U.S.C. 5 1997e(a); Drennon v. Idaho State Correctional Institution, 145 Idaho 598, 602, 18 1 P.3d 
I I procedure and that William Lightner was familiar with the prison grievance system, having used it 2 5 
2 3 
24 
524, 528 (2007). There is sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that ISCI has a grievance 
2 6 000074 
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in the past for similar issues. There is also sufficient evidence to ascepzain that not only did Mr. 
Lightner fail to exhaust the administrative remedy process, he failed to avail himself of this process 
at all with regard to the October s~~spension f visitation. 
Plaintiffs asserl that this is not a condition of confinement case, '"but only the ternination of 
his wife's visitation privileges" and has "a constitutional issue of material fact." Response and 
Objection to State" Motion for Summary Judment, 'lj 16. The Eighth h e n b e n t ,  which prohibits 
cruel and musual punishents, imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of 
confinement and to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. Helling v. 
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993). Conditions of confinenlent that are subject to exhaustion 
have been defined broadly by federal courts as the effects of actions by govement  officials on the 
lives of and discipline of persons confined in prisons. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 475, 499 
(1973); Sinitk v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir.2001); see also Lawrence v. Goord, 304 F.3d 
198, 200 (2d Cir.2002); 18 U.S.C. $ 3626(g)(2). The detemination of who may visit an inmate at 
what time, subject to what restrictions, and for how long is an action by a govement  officials that 
I I has an effect on the life of a person confined to prison. The Court finds that this is a condition of 17 
l8 I1 confinemenr case to wkch the exhaustion requirement applies. 
l l  The Plaintiffs cite cases where the federal exhaustion requirement was held not to apply, but 
1 1 Another dealt with unhealthy air. Bishop v. Lewis, 155 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1998). Requiring inmates 1 
2 0  
2 1  
these cases are very different from the one at hand. One cited case dealt with cell temperatures that 
would cause inmates to become hypothennic. Mitchell v. Shomig, 969 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. lL. 1997). 
2 3 
2 4 
to follow a grievance procedure in a life threatening situation would be improper. The Lightners' 
2 5 
2 6 00007 
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ll situation was not life threatening. Plaintiff W i l l i a  Lightner failed to exhaust the IDOC grievance 
I1 process. Defendants' motion for s m a r y  judpent  with regard to this issue is granted. 
/I must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation. Jones v. Willinrrrs, 297 I 
3 
4 
/ I  (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 1983 liability must be based on the personal involvement of the 
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS RAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST DIRECTOR BRENT mlNKE 
In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under Section 1983, there 
lo ll defendant)). There is no respondeat superior liability under this section. Id. (citing Monell v. Dep't 
l1 /I of SOC. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (rejecting the concept of respondeat superior liability in the 
l2 11 section 1983 context and requiring individual liability for the constitutional violation). Further, in a 
l3 
14 
l8 I! Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue is granted. 
civil rights complaint, the circumstances constituting violation of a civil or constitutional right must 
be stated in the complaint with particularity. I.R.C.P. 9(b). Plaintiffs do not identify any alleged 
15 
16 
1 7  
constitutional violation personally caused by Director Reinke. Plaintiffs also fail to make any 
factual allegations of constitutional violations against Director Reinke is their amended complaint. 
21 1 1  participation in the alleged rights deprivation and in any civil rights action the circumstances I 
19 
2 o 
2 2  1 constituting that violation must be stated with paxticularity. The record indicates that Mr. Nelson 
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT S EVE NELSON 
As stated above, in an inmate civil rights action, there must be a showing of personal 
was not employed at the facility at the time of the October visitation suspension. AfJ: John 
2 4 / I  Hardisorr, 7 12. As Mr. Nelson was not at the facility at the time of the visitation suspension, his I 
/I ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 6 I 
/ I  personal participation in it would not be possible. Defendants' motion for summary judment with 
I1 regard to this issue is granted. 
4 
5 
Overto~z v. Buzzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (citations omitted). 
Protected liberty interests "may arise from two sources-the Due Process Clause itself and 
~ G H T S  







1 2  
l5 I /  the laws of the States." Ky. Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (quoting 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 448 U.S. 609, 618, 619-20 (1984). However, the United States 
Supreme Court has limited the protection of relationships where incarceration is a factor. 
The very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate 
does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration. And, as our cases have 
established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with 
incarceration. Some curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison 
context. 
/I Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). "The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution does 
l7 I1 not, of its own force, create a liberty interest . . . , for it is well settled that an inmate does not have a 
18 1 1  liberty interest in the denial of contact visits by a spouse, relatives, children, and friends." Block v. I 
I I within the terns of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Thompson, 490 U.S. 2 1 
1 9  
2 0 
2 2  I1 at 461 (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468). 
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984). The denial of a prisoner's access to a particular visitor "is well 
j5 1 1  interest, it must contain "explicitly mandatory language." Thompson 490 U.S. at 463 (quoting 
2 3 
24 
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However, state statutes or regulations can create a due process liberty interest where none 
otherwise would have existed. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 461. For a state law to create a liberty 
Page 7 
I I I+ewitt, 459 U.S. at 472). In Sandin, the United States Supreme Court held that liberty interests are 1 
2 
11 not created by negative implications from mlindatory language in prison regulations. Sandin v. I 
4 
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Rather, to create a liberty interest, the action taken must be an 
atsical and significant deprivation from the normal incidenls of prison life. Id. Where the language 
6 
I I finding of guilt, the ternination of the privilege violated due process); T~ylor v. Armontrout, 894 9 
of state statutes and reelations create a right, that right is entitled to due process protection. See 
Mendozu v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where a prison regulation 
7 
8 
contained explicit mandaroy lanmage that a visiting privilege could only be suspended after a 
l2 11 Idaho Board of Correction Rule 604 states in pertinent part: 
10 
,, 
Nothing in Section 604 establishes a right to visit any inmate. Nothing in Section 604 
should be interpreted as an expectation that visitation will be approved between any 
person and my inmate if the Department has suspended, terminated, or revoked a 
visitor or inmate's visiting privileges. 
F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding regulation that stated peoples whose nanles appear on the list 
"shall" be allowed to visit created a right to visitation entitled to due process protection). 
Inmate visitation is allowed at the discretion of the facility head or designee. Each 
division may develop standard operating procedures and field memoranda to govern 
inmate visiting. 
A person who has pending criminal charges or who is the subject of a criminal 
investigation will not be permitted to visit an inmate, except upon written approval of 
the facility head or designee. 
inmates to exercise the asserted right; 3) what impact an accommodation of the right would have on 
guards and inmates and prison resources; and 4) whether there are ready alternatives to the 
regulation. Id. at 132. The burden is on the challenger to disprove the validity of the regulation, not 
on the prison to prove the validity of the regulation. Id. "The status of a person as a prisoner or a 
non-prisoner does not determine whether the Turner test applies to prison regulations that may 
affect both prisoners and non-prisoners." Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,411 n. 9 (rejecting "any attempt to forge separate standards for 
cases implicating the rights of outsiders"). 
Preventing an inmate from visiting with someone accused of harboring a fugitive serves the 
legitimate penological purpose of protecting the security of the institution. Preventing visits which 
habitually create a disturbance serves the legitimate penological purpose of minimizing disruption 
in the visiting area. The Court finds that Warden Hardison was acting with the penological purpose 










Additionally, Rule 604 makes clear that visits may be suspended, restricted, or terminated at any 
time, for any period of time at the discretion of the facility head in accordance with stand& 
operating procedures. IDAPA 06.01 .01.404.06. 
Plairltiffs challenge the constitutionality of Rule 604. The United States Suprerne Court 
established a four factor test to determine the validity of a prison regulation affecting a 
constitutional right. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). ln 2003, the Unites States Supreme Court 
applied that test to a challenge to the constitutionality of a prison visitation regulation. Overton v. 
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) The Turner factors are: 1) whether the regulation has a valid, 
rational connection to a legitimate government interest; 2) whether alternative means are open to 
/ I  States Supreme Court in Overtun. Based on the evidence provided, the Lightners' visits are 
2 
4 1 1  challalging for the guards, a drain on prison resources, and unfair to other inmates in that more time 
to mail services. These alternative methods of communication were fomd sufficient by the United 
"must h e n  with the Li@bers to the deliinlent of other visitors. As to the impact an 





accommodation for the Lightners would have on guards and imates  and prison resources, even 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the evidence shows that an attempt to 
accommodate the Lightners could have been umeasonably time consuming and burdensome on the 
l3  1 1  right while not imposing more than a de minirnus cost to the valid penological goal." Overton, 539 
,, 
12 
l4 / I  U.S. at 136. Plaintiffs have provided no such alternative nor does one seem to exist within the 
stated, "Turner does not impose a least restrictive alternative test, but asks instead whether the 
prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted 




l9 I1 by the suspension of visitation. Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue 
limited resources of the DOC. 
The Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden in showing the regulation to be 
2 0 ( 1  is granted. 
2 1 
22 
WHETHER DEFENDANT ~IARDISON IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 




entitled to the defense consists of: 1.) Was there a clearly established law? 2.) Did the conduct of 
the party asserting qualified immunity violate a clearly established right of the party claiming the 
2 6 
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/ I violation? and 3 .) Was the conduct of the party asserting qualified immunity reasonable? Furnworth 
1 I 
I1 v. Fernling, 125 Idaho 283, 286, 869 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1994). If a reasonable official could have 
/I v. fincheloe, 987 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1993)). Only where there is a genuine issue of fact that 
3 
4 
6 1 / would preclude a grant of summary judgment, should the court let the case to proceed to trial. Id. I 
believed that his actions were lawful, smmary judpent  on the basis of qualified imuni ty  is 
appropriate. Mfiinsey v. Vernon, 130 Idaho 354, 357, 941 P.2d 327, 329 (1997) (quoting Hemptiill 
11 Overton provides established law that visitation regulations which are rationally related to a 
lo 1 1  visitation, therefore Defendant Wardison did not violate that right by imposing an indefinite 
8 
9 
I1 suspension of the Lightners' visitation. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 
legitimate penological interest are constitutional. There is no Constitutional right to unrestricted 
l4 11 Marcia Lightner was fooled by a fugitive and assisted her in her flight. The warden's actions were I 
1 2  
l3 
objectively reasonable to ensure the security of the facility and minimize cost to the facility. 
1 6  
the c i rc~~stances  surrounding the Lightners' visits are a security risk and costly to the facility. 
William Lightner would be a flight risk if he were to have an opportunity to leave the facility. 
I/ Defendant Hardison is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants' motion for summary judgment 
17 
I I with regard to this issue is granted. 18 
19 
2 o 
consortium claims based on the violation of the spouse's civil rights." Jeremiah v. Yanke Machine 
2 4 
WHETHER MARCIA LICHTNER~ CLAIM FOR ]LOSS OF CONSORTIUM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A claim for loss of consortium "is a wholly derivative cause of action contingent upon a 
2 1  
22 
third party's tortious injury to a spouse." Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Products, Znc., 1 07 Idaho 389, 
394,690 P.2d 324,329 (1984). "[Flederal courts have almost unanimously denied derivative loss of 
2 5 
Shop, Znc., 13 1 Idaho 242, 249, 953 P.2d 992, 999 (1998 ). In Jeremiah, the Idaho Supreme Court 
2 6 
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O o o o 8  t 
would not add a common law remedy which was not recognized in the statute, Title VII or the Idaho 
Human Rights Act. This case is similar. Mr. Lightner a s s e ~ s  federal and state law claims that his 
i l  rights were inf~nged but neither Section 1983 nor the Habeas Corpus and Institutional 
igation Procedures Act, ldafio Code $4 19-4201 to 19-4236, recognizes a loss of consortium 
se of action. Even if Mr. Light-ner's claim were not barred by his failure to exhaust 
dministrative remedies and if that claim were to have succeeded, a loss of consortium claim based 
pon alleged violation of civil rights fails as a matter of law. Defendants' motion for summary 
rnent with regard to this issue is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
-r 
Dated this 22 day of January, 2009. 
000082 
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I /  CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1, HEREBY CERTlFY that on th&L'L'day of January, 2009,I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DKNDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 1  to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
6 
William. Lightner 
1CC Unit-C PO Box 7001 0 
Boise, ID 83707 
8 
51 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Wand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Marcia Lightner 
300 E. 41 st Street 
Garden City, ID 83724 
12 
00 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Mark Kubinski 
1299 N. Orchard, Ste. 1 10 
Boise, ID 83706 
( ~ u . s .  Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
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Jt 41438 ICC W T - C  
PO BOX 700 10 
BOISE, D 83707 
APPELLMTS, PRO, SE 
IN TZE DISWCT COURT OF FOURTH m I C N  DISTNCT 
OF THE S T A E  OF DAIlO, IN AND FOR THE C O W Y  OF ADA 
W L L W  L1 R 1 Case No. rVr-OC-07-20193 
MARCIA LIGHTNER 1 
Appellant's Pro, Se ) NOmCE OF APPEAL 
1 
DOC DIWCTOR, BRENT RENK-E et., al. ) 
JOEIN W I S O N ,  1 
STEVE NELSON, ) 
Respondent's ) 
TO: THE ABOVE RESPOmEWS, ADA C O W Y  4" DISTRICT COURT et, al 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTMG OFFICE et., al, AND ADA C O W Y  PUBLIC D E F W E R S  
OFFICE et., d. AND THE PARTIES ATTORNEYS, MARK KlJZ3INSK.I PROSECWWG 
ATTORNEY'S AND T I E  CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTlCE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT 
1. The above named Appellant William Lightner, and Marcia Lightner appeals against the 
above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from Memorandum opinion and order 
dismissing the Appellants Civil Rights Complaint. (See attached M e m o m d m  Opinion and 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1 - 
Order) entered in the above-entitled action (proceeding) on the 22 December 2008, Honorable 
Ronald J. Wilper. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment or orders 
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule (I 1 (a), 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on apped which the appellw then intends to assert in 
the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting 
other issues an appeal. 
A. Marcia Lightners, loss of consoflim due process constitutional rights were violated 
do to no hearing afforded her prior to visitation suspension. 
B. William Lightners, loss of consortium when wife's visitation was suspended 
without due process hearing, the lack of a grievance process in place to grieve the warden 
C. The Lack ofa  grievance process being in place to grieve the listed final appellate 
authority 
D. Lack of Due Process for a hearing, Double Jeopardy, and Retaliation. 
4. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: 
1 .  Transcripts from hearing on 1 1 - 14-2008 
2. Transcripts from hearing on 12-22-2008. 
The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(a), I.A.R. 
Appellant has the Transcriwts; 
G The entire reporter's transcript supplemented by the following: 
LJ Voir 13ire examination of jury 
! J Closing argments of counsel 
i 1 The following reporter" ppartid transcript: 
i i The Testimony of witnesses 
i : Conferences on requested ins&uctions 
i t  lmmctions verbally given by court 
5 .  "The appellant requests the following documents to be included I the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically in~luded under Rule 28, 1.A.R. 
Appellant requests: 
1 .  1 - 14-2008 Civil Rights Complaint 
2. 6- 16-08 Amended Civil Rights Complaint 
3. 1 1 -2 1-2008 Memorandum for Summary Judgment 
4. 1 1-2 1-2008 Afiidavit of Jill Whittington 
5. 1 1-2 1-2008 Affidavit of Mark A. Kubibski 
6. 1 1-2 1-2008 ANFidavit of John Wardison 
7. 12-9-2008 Response and objection to States Motion for Summary 
Judgment with Aadavits in support. 
(2) Affidavits. (William and Marcia Lighmers Affidavits) 
8. 12- 15-2008 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b)( 1) That the derk of the district court or adminismive qency has been paid the 
estimated fee for prepmtion of rcpaer's transcript. 
(2) )f That the appsllant is exempt from paying the estimated trdnscript fee because 
he is indigent and has already been granted indigence; 
( c)(l j : 1 That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk or agency's record has been 
paid. 
(2) : I That the appellant is exempt from. paying the estimated fee for the preparation 
of the record because the affiant is indigent. 
(d)(l) !I That the appellate filing fite has been paid per the court's order of partial 
payment; 
2) )k. That appellate is exempt &om paying the appellate filing fee because he is 
indigent as shown by the court's order of partial payment of fees; 
(e) That service has been made upon all parities required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-140 1 (1)' Idaho 
Code. 
Dated th is /L  day of March, 2009 
Dated this dday of March, 2009 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-4- 000087 
STATE OF IDA130 ) 
>ss. 
Counp of Ada 
Willim Lightner, being sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the appellmt in the above-entitled NOTICE OF APPEAL and that all sbtements 
in this Notice Of Appeal are true and correct b the best of his howledge and belief 
5-29 - 3 a y  
Appellant Pro, Se 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /D@ day of ) &  ,2009 
SEAL: 
ommission expires: .$- /C. --A c' / c: 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ( 
Marcia Lightner, being sworn, deposes and says: /" 
That he is the appellant in the aboveentitled NOTICE OF &EAL and that all syements 
in this Notice Of Appeal are true and correct to the 
-J-/desrno7 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day o 
SEAL: 
ommission expires: 5--/& -Ad /L> 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-5- 000088 
CERTIFICATE OF MAlLINC 
1 I1EKEBY CERTIFY, That on the day of March, 2009,I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the NOTICE OF APPEAL via US mail system to: 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENEML 
APPELLATE UNIT 
PO BOX, 83720. 
BOISE, IDAHO 83720-00 10 
M A W  KUBlNSKl County Deputy 
200 W FRONT STREET, 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-00 10 
NOTICE OF A P P E A L 4  
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH m I C I A L  
THE STATE OF D M O ,  IN FOR THE ~ o ~ y  OF AJ)A 




I Case No. CVOC-0720 1 93 
OFU3ER GUNTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
JOHN HARDISON, BRENT REINKE, 




I I Kubinski appeared for the Defendants. The Court took the matter under advisement at that time. For 2 L 




I Coon heard oral arguments on Manday, December 22, 2008. The Plaintiffs appeared pro se, Mrs. 
Lightner in person and Mr. Lightner telephonically from the Idaho Correctional Center. Mark 
In 1989, Marcia Lightner received a withheld judgment for an unknown charge. A g  izrlnrrio I 
2 2 
Ltgl~r~rt~t.,: Frlrihrr A. Wl~ile serving a prison sentence, William Lightner met Marcia, who was a I 
the reasons stated below, Defendantsy motion is granted. 
2 6 
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II contract vendor at the commissw at the Idaho State Correctional Institute (ISCI). Civil Rights I 
1 1  Compluint. 7 27. In 1997, the couple m ~ e d  and William Lightner remained incarcerated. Civil 
Rights Conplaint, 1 27. In 1998, Willim Li@tner used the grievance process in regard to visitation I 
II issues. AH Jill Whittifigton, 7 13. The Li&tners objected to the prison policy that denied visitation 1 I to the couple. Firs! Amended Civil Rig&& Complaint, 7 29. Restricted visitation was granted and the I 





II On April 10, 2007, Marcia Lightner was arrested for the felony of"fense of harboring a felon 
L~ghtners objected to the forrn of the visitation granted. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, 'fl 
29. In 2000 or 2001, the Liatners received full visitation. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, 'fl 
29. In 2005 William Lightner granted parole. Af l  John Nardison, 7 6; M i b i t  L). M i l e  he was on 
l2 ll in violation of Idaho Code $ 18-205. Afl Marcia Lightner, 'fl 5;  AfJ: Mark hliibinski, Exhibit A .  The 
l3  11 following day she was released on bail. Aff Marcia Lightner. 7 5.  Early in the morning on April 12, I 
14 11 2008, Marcia Lightner went to the Idaho State Correctional Institute and was informed that her I 
I I Lightner wrote to Warden Blades attempting to explain the circumstances of the event and pleading 17 1 
15 
16 
IS I/ for reinstatement of visitation. Afl Marcia Lightner, Exhibit A.  Warden Blades reinstated the 
visitation was suspended as a result of her arrest. AH fircia Lightner, 'fl 10. Subsequently, Marcia 
21 11 failed to provide any other updates. rlfS Xkrrcia Ligkitler, 71 18. 
19 
20  
Lightners' visitation on the condition that she keep the facility informed of the status of her case. -- -- - - - 
A 8  Marcia Lightner, 'fl 16. Marcia Lightner contacted the staff in August 2007 with an update, but 
2 2 
2 3 
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The Lightners have a history of violating facility policies. On November 29, 2006, William 
.* 




for violating the visitor contact rules at the beginning and conclusion of his visits with Marcia 
- 
Lightner. Afl John Hardison, Exhibit G. On December 28, 2006, Willim Lightner was issued a 
BOR for inappropriate goodbye. Id. On July 22,2007, other visitors to the Idaho State Conectional - - 
Institute complained that Marcia Lightner was changing the order of the visitors log and was 
dressed inappropriately for visiting, including sheer, revealing clolhinl; and a lack of undergments. 
Id. On August 27, 2007, Marcia Li&tner parked in an accessible space but failed to display her _ _ - _ _ _ _ _  __----I_------ - - 
disabled identification pemit. Id. When r e ~ n d e d  to be sure that her pemit was displayed, Marcia 
C . 
L i & ~ e r  exhibited hostility to the officer. Id. 
On October 1, 2007, Marcia Lightner was infomed by telephone that visitation was 
11 suspended because she was a security risk and that there was a possibility of reconsideration 
I1 pending the outcome of her case. Af l  Marcia Lightner, 3 21. Although requests for a personal 
l2 11 meeting were made, Director Brent Reinke did not meet with Marcia Lightner regarding the I 
visitation suspension. A@ Marcia Lightner, 1 23. No internal grievances relating to visitation issues 
were filed by William Lightner between January 2007 and January 2008. Aff: JiIl Nhittington, 11 13. 
I I year probation sentence. A f l  Mark Kubinski, Exhibit A .  The harboring a felon charge was dismissed I 
15 
16 
as part of the plea agreement. A f l  Marcia Liglttner, 1 5 .  The Lightners have had visitation since 
June 13, 2008. Afl John Hurclison, E-rhibif H. To compensate for the period of separation, the 
Lightners seek an award of $120,000 and $12,500.00 per missed visit--a total of nearly $1.5 
million. First ilitletlcic~d Civil Rights Coirtplrint, i 1 . 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judpent  is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
000092 
On March 3 1, 2008, Marcia Lightner pled guilty to obstructing justice and received a two 
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reveals that no disputed issues of material fact exist, then only a question of law remains. Firsf Sex. 
Bank uf Mulzo, N.A. v. Mirrphy, 13 1 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1 998). In a motion for 
summary judwent, all disputed facts are consmed liberally in favor of the non-moving party and 
all reasonable inferences drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the: non-moving party. 
See Williams v. Blukley, 114 Idaho 323, 324, 757 P.2d 186, 187 (1988); Biake v. Cmz, 108 ldaho 
253, 255, 698 P.2d 315, 317 (1985). Idaho Rule of Civil Proeedwe 56(e) provides that a.n adverse 
party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits 
1 






l9 11 EXHAUST HE ISCI GRIEVANCE PROCESS 
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stufts, 125 Idaho 208, 
21 1, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1 994). The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set 
forth facts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testifjl. 
Id., I.R.C.P. 56(e). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's case must 





j0 I/ It is well established that a prisoner may not bring an action with respect to conditions of 
a genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69 
(1 996). 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF WILLIAM LIGHTNER'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED UE TO HIS FAILURE TO 
21 II confinement without first exhausting available administrative remedies. Idaho Code 9 19-4206; 42 
2 2  1 / I.S.C. 8 1997eta); Dretttlon v. Llnho State Correcrionnl Insfittrrion, 145 Idaho 598, 602, 18 1 P.3d I 
2 3  / /  524, 528 (2007) There is suscient evidence in the record to indicate that ISCI has a grievance I 




procedure and that William Lightner was familiar with the prison gievance system, having used it 
00009 
11 Lightner fail to exhaust the administrative remedy process, he failed to avail himself of this process 
I/ at ail with regard to the October suspension of visitation. 
4 11 Plaintiffs assert that this is not a condition of confinement case, "but only the termination of 11 his wife's visitation privileges" and has "a constitutional issue of material fact." Response and 





l1 /I have been defined broadly by federal courts as the effects of actions by government officials on the 
Objection to State" Motion for Summary Judgment, 3 16. The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits 
cruel and unusual punisbents, imposes a duty on pfison officials to provide humane conditions of 
confinement and to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates. HeIIing v. 
l2 II lives of and discipline of persons confined in prisons. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 475, 499 
l3  I1 (1973); Snzitlz v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir.2001); see also Lawrence v. Goord, 304 F.3d 





21 11 would wusc inmates to become hypothermic. hfitircltellv. Sltomig, 969 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. IL. 1997). 
what time, subject to what restrictions, and for how long is an action by a government officials that 
has an effect on the life of a person confined to prison. The Court finds that this is a condition of 
confinement case to which the exhaustion requirement applies. 
19 
2 0  
The PlaintifEs cite cases where the federal exhaustion requirement was held not to apply, but 





Another dealt with unhealthy air. Bishop v. Lewis, 155 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1998). Requiring inmates 
to foIlotv a grievance procedure in a life threatening situation would be improper. The Lightners' 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5 
situation was not life threatening. PlaintiE Willim Lightner failed to exhaust the DOC grievance 
process. Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue is granted. 
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS WAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST D I R E ~ O R  B ENT REINKE 
In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under Section 1983, there 
must be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation. Jones v. Williams, 297 
F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring 
personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations); May v. Enornoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 1983 liability must be based on the personal involvement of the 
defendm)). There is no respondeat superior liability under this section. Id. (citing Monell v. Dep'r 
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1 978) (rejecting the concept of respondeat superior liability in the 
section 1983 context and requiring individual liability for the constitutional violation). Further, in a 
civil rights complaint, the circumstances constituting violation of a civil or constitutional right must 
be stated in the complaint with particularity. I.R.C.P. 9(b). Plaintiffis do not identifjl any alleged 
constitutional violation personally caused by Director Reinke. Plaintiffs also fail to make any 
factual allegations of constitutional violations against Director Reinke is their amended complaint. 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue is granted. 
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS WAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANT S EVE NELSON 
As stated above, in an inmate civil rights action, there must be a showing of personal 
participation in the alleged rights deprivation and in any civil rights action the circumstances 
constituting that violation must be stated with particularity. The record indicates that Mr. Nelson 
was not employed at the facility at the time of the October visitation suspension. A$ John 
Ifrrrclisoir, 1; 12. As Mr. Nelson was not at the facility at the time of the visitation suspension, his 
I I ORDER GRANT1NG DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JblDGMENT - Page 6 
I /  personal pa~ticipation in it would not be possible. Defendants' motion for s m a r y  judment with 
I regard to this issue is granted. 
/ I  WHETHER THE DENIAL OF MARCIA LICHTNER'S VISITATION VBOLATE HER CONSTITUT!ONAL 
1 1  The Unites States Constitution protwts "certain kinds of highly personal relationships." I 11 Robertr v. United State iuycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 619-20 (1984). However, the United States 
context. 
Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 13 1 (2003) (citations omitted). 






l5 I1 the laws of the States." Ky. Dep't of Corrections Y. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (quoting 
Supreme Court has limited the protection of relationsbps where incarceration is a factor. 
The very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate 
does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration. And, as our cases have 
established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with 
incarceration. Some curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison 
l6 1 1  Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). "'The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution does 
l7 I1 not, of its own force, create a liberty interest . . . , for it is well settled that an inmate does not have a 




23  I1 However, state statutes or regulations can create a due process liberty interest where none 
liberty interest in the denial of contact visits by a spouse, relatives, children, and friends." Block v. 
Rutherford 468 U.S. 576 (1984). The denial of a prisoner's access to a particular visitor "is well 
within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Thonzpson, 490 U.S. 
2i I1 otherwise would have existed. Tlzotttpsotz, 490 U.S. at 461. For a state law to create a liberty 
! 1 ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 7 
2 5  
2 6 
interest, it must contain "explicitly mandatory language." Thornpson 490 U.S. at 463 (quoting 
000096 
I I He~pitt, 459 U.S .  at 472). In Sandin, the United States Supreme Court held that liberty interests are 1 
1 1  not created by negative implications from mandatory language in prison regulations. Sandin v. 
3 
4 
finding of guilt, the termination of the privilege violated due proeess); Tuylor v. Armontrout, 894 
9 
Conner, 5 15 U.S.  472, 484 (1995). Rather, to create a liberty interest, the action taken must be an 
atypical and significmt deprivation from the normal incidents of prison life. Id. W e r e  the lanpage 
of state statutes and regulations create a right, that right is entitled to due proeess protection. See 
6 
7 
F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding regulation that stated peoples whose names appear on the list I 
Mendmu v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where a prison regulation 
contained explicit mandatory language that a visiting privilege could only be suspended after a 
, , I I "shall" be allowed to visit created a right to visitation entitled to due process protection). I 
Idaho Board of Correction Rule 604 states in pertinent part: 
Nothing in Section 604 establishes a right to visit any inmate. Nothing in Section 604 
should be interpreted as an expectation that visitation will be approved between any 
person and any inmate if the Department has suspended, terminated, or revoked a 
visitor or inmate's visiting privileges. 
Inmate visitation is allowed at the discretion of the facility head or designee. Each 
division may develop standard operating procedures and field memoranda to govern 
inmate visiting. 
A person who has pending criminal charges or who is the subject of a criminal 
investigation will not be permitted to visit an inmate, except upon written approval of 
the facility head or designee. 
Additionally, Rule 604 makes clear that visits may be suspended, restricted, or terminated at any 
time, for any period of time at the discretion of the facility head in accordance with standard 
operating procedures. IRAPA 06.01.01.604.06. 
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Rule 604. The United States Supreme Court 
established a four factor test to detemine the validity of a prison regulation affecting a 
constitutionai right. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In 2003, the Unites States Supreme Court 
applied that test to a challenge to the constitutionality of a prison visitation regulation. Overtan v. 
Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) The Turner factors are: 1) whether the regulation has a valid, 
rational connection to a legitimate govement interest; 2) whether alternative means are open to 
imates to exercise the asserted right; 3) what impact an accommodation of the right would have on 
guards and inmates and prison resources; and 4) whether there are ready alternatives to the 
regulation. Id. at 132. The burden is on the challenger to disprove the validity of the regulation, not 
on the prison to prove the validity of the regulation. Id. "The status of a person as a prisoner or a 
non-prisoner does not detemine whether the Turner test applies to prison regulations that may 
affect both prisoners and non-prisoners." Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,411 n. 9 (rejecting ' b y  attempt to forge separate standards for 
I 
cases implicating the rights of outsiders"). 
Preventing an inmate from visiting with someone accused of harboring a fugitive serves the 
legitimate penological purpose of protecting the security of the institution. Preventing visits which 
habitually create a disturbance serves the legitimate penological purpose of minimizing disruption 
in the visiting area. The Court finds that Warden Hardison was acting with the penological purpose 
to preserve the safe, secure, and orderly operation of the facility. Alternative means of 
00009 
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cornmunicatiot~ are available to the Lightners, they have regular telephone conversations and access 
to mail services. These alternative methods of comunication were foutd sufficient by the United 
States Supreme Court in Overton. Based on the evidence provided, the Lightners' vislts are 
challenging for the guards, a drain on prison resources, and unfair to other inmates in that more time 
must be spent with the Li@hem to the detriment of other visitors. As to the impact an 
accomn~odation for the Lightners would have on guards and inmates and prison resources, even 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the evidence shows that an attempt to 
accommodate the Lightners could have been unreasonably time consuming and burdensome on the 
facility and the other inmates. In explanation of the fourth factor, the Unites States Supreme Court 
stated, '"Turner does not impose a least restrictive alternative test, but asks instead whether the 
prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted 
right while not imposing more than a de minimus cost to the valid penological goal." Overton, 539 
U.S. at 135. Plaintiffs have provided no such alternative nor does one seem to exist within the 
limited resources of the DOC. 
The Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden in showing the regulation to be 
unconstitutional. The Court finds that Marcia Lightner's constitutional rights have not been violated 
by the suspension of visitation. Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue 
is granted. 
WHETHER D E F E N D ~ N T  WARDISON IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED I % I ~ ~ U K I T Y  
The three-part inquiry to determine if a public official asserting qualified immunity is 
entitled to the defense consists of: I.) Was there a clearly established law? 2.) Did the conduct of 
the party asserting qualified immunity violate a clearly established right of the party claiming the 
00009 
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II violation? and 3.) Was the conduct of the party asserting qualified immunity reasonable? Farnworth 
2 
11 v. Fenzling, 125 Idaho 283, 286, 869 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1994). If a reasonable official could have 
believed that his actions were lawful, su ary judment on the basis of qualified immunity is 
I1 appropriate. Mck'irlsq v. Vernon, 139 Idaho 354,357,941 P.2d 327,329 (1997) (quoting Hemphill 11 v. Kineheloc, 087 F.2d 589, 593 (9th Cir. 1993)). Only where there is a genuine issue of fact that 
11  would preclude a grant of summary judgment, should the court let the case to proceed to trial. Id. 
I I legitimate penologcal interest are constitutional. There is no Constitutional right to unrestricted 9 
7 
8 
lo II visitation, therefore Defendanl Hardison did not violate that right by imposing an indefinite 
Overton provides established law that visitation regulations which are rationally related to a 
,, 
1 2  
l3  
1 4  
suspension of the Lightners' visitation. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 
the circumstances surrounding the Lightners' visits are a security risk and costly to the facility. 
William Lightner would be a flight risk if he were to have an opportunity to leave the facility. 
Marcia Lightner was fooled by a fugitive and assisted her in her flight. The warden's actions were 
15 
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
2 2  ( 1  394,690 P.?d 324,329 (1984). "[Fledera1 courts have almost unanimously denied derivative loss of 
objectively reasonable to ensure the security of the facility and minimize cost to the facility. 
Defendant Hardison is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants' motion for summary judgment 
with regard to this issue is granted. 
19 
2 o 
2 1  
WHETHER MARCIA LIGHTNER'S CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A claim for loss of consortium "is a wholly derivative cause of action contingent upon a 
third party's tortious injury to a spouse." Runeurn I .  Slzectrer Lumber Protizicts, Irtc., 107 Idaho 389, 
2 3 
1 4  
consortium claims based on the violation of the spouse's civil rights.'Veretniuh v. Yunke Muchitle 
S/tc>p, IIIC., 131 Idaho 232, 249, 953 P.2d 992, 999 (1998). In Jere~niuh, the Idaho Supreme Court 
2 6  
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I /  Human Rights Act. This case is similar. Mr. Lightner asserts federal and state law claims that his 
1 
Ilcivil rights were infringed bet neither Section 1983 nor the Habe= Corpus and Institutional 
would not add a common law remedy which was not recognized in the statute, Title V I  or the Idaho 
' Ilcause of action. Even if Mr. Lightner's claim were not barred by his failure to exhaust 
4 
' /I administrative remedies and if that claim were to have succeeded, a loss of consortium claim based 
Litigation Procedures Act, Idaho Code 44 19-4201 to 19-4226, recognizes a loss of consortium 
upon alleged violation of civil rights fails as a matter of law. Defendants' motion for sumnlary 
11 judgment with regard to this issue is granted. 
-t" 
Dated this 24' day of January, 2009. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
'? --# 
I, HEWBY CERTIFY that on thMzday of January, 2009, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT" MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
William Lightner 
ICG Unit-C PO Box 700 10 
Boise, ID 83707 
Mmia  Lightner 
300 E. 41st Street 
Garden City, ID 837 14 
Mark Kubinski 
1299 N. Orchard, Ste. 1 10 
Boise, ID 83706 
& U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(9 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(\j U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
Ada County, Idaho 
00010 
0 K l ) f l R  CiRAii TINCi IIEFENUANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDG:MENT - Page 13 
W ZLLIAM LIGI-fW ER 
# 41438 ICC UNIT-C 
PO BOX 700 10 
BOISE. ID 83707 
s, DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By A, LYKE 
DEWW 
MARCIA LICHTNER 
300 E 41'' 
GARDEN CITY, ID 837 1 4 
APPELLANTS, PRO, SE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WILLIAM LICHTMER ) Case No. CV-OC-07-20193 
MARCIA 1,IGHTNER 1 
Appellant's Pro, Se ) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
IDOC DIRECTOR, BRENT RENKE et., al. ) 
JOHN HARDISON. ) 
STEVE NELSON, 1 
Respondent's 1 
TO: THE ABOVE RESPONDENTS, ADA COUNTY 4r" DISTRICT COURT et, a1 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING OFFICE et., al, AND ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
OFFICE et., al. AND THE PARTIES ATTORNEYS, MARK KUBINSKI PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY'S, THE CLERK AND REPORTER OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant William Lightner, and Marcia Lightner appeals against the 
above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from Memorandum opinion and order 
dismissing the Appellants Civil Rights Complaint. (See attached Memorandum Opinion and Order 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-I- 
in the first Notice of Appeal) entered in the above-entitled action (proceeding) on the 22 December 
2008, Honorable Ronald J. Wilper. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment or orders 
described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursmt  to Rule (1 1 (a), 
3. A preliminw statement of the issues on appeal which the appellmt then intends to assert in 
the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the appellant from asserting 
other issues on appeal. 
A. Marcia Lightners, due process constitutional rights were violated do to not hearing 
afforded her prior to visitation suspension. 
B. William Lightners, loss of consortium when wife's visitation was suspended 
without due process. 
4. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: 
I. Transcripts from hearing on 1 1 - 14-2008 
3 . Transcripts from hearing on 12-22-2008. 
The entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25(a), I.A.R. 
Appellant has the Transcripts; 
TI The entire reporter's transcript supplemented by the following: 
2 Voir Dire examination of jury 
il Closing arguments of counsel 
O The following reporter's partial transcript: 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-2- 
J From all Heaings held during this case: 
i ! The Testimony of wihesses 
Ci  Conferences on requested insmctions 
i 1 Instmctions verbally given by court 
5. The appellant requests the following documents to be included I the clerk's record in 
addition to those aulornatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
Appellmt requests: 
1. 1-14-2008 Civil Rights Complaint 
2. 6- 1 6-08 Amended Civil Rights Complaint 
3. 1 1 -2 1 -2008 Memorandum for Summary Judgment 
4. 1 1-2 1-2008 Affidavit of Jill Wittington 
5. 1 1-2 1-2008 Affidavit of Mark A. Kubinski 
6. 1 1-2 1-2008 AMidavit of John Hardison 
7. 12-9-2008 Response and objection to States Motion for Summary 
Judgment with Affidavits in support. 
(2) Affidavits. (William and Marcia Lightners Affidavits) 
8. 12-1 5-2008 Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for 
S w a r y  Judgment. 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b)(l) U That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the 
estimated fee for preparation of reporter's transcript. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-3- 
(2) 1/ That the appellant is exempt tiom paying the estimated transcript fee because 
he is indigent and has already been grmted indigence; 
( c)(l) ,i That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk or agency's record has been 
paid. 
(2) J That the appellanl; is exempt from paying the estimated f"ee for the preparation 
of the record because the affiant is indigent. 
(d)(l) , A  That the appellate filing fee has been paid per the court's order of partial 
2) p7; That appellate is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because he is 
indigent as s h o w  by the court's order of partial payment of fees; 
(e) That service has been made upon all parities required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 and the attorney general of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-140 1(1), Idaho 
Code. 
Dated this J M a y  of March, 2009 
Dated t h i 6 d a y  of March, 2009 
APPELLANT PRO, SE / 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL4 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Ada ( 
William Lightner, being sworn, deposes and says: 
That he is the appellant in the above-entitled AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL and that all 
statements in this Amended Notice Of Appeal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and 
belief. 
Appellant Pro, Se 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of k ( a ~ , -  ,2009 
SEAL: HERBERT J. WILS 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO Commission expires: r3--/ L -27 /, 0 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
>ss. 
County of Ada 
Marcia Lightner, being sworn, deposes and says: 
'That he is the appellant in the above-entitled AMENDED N OF APPEAL and that all 
statements in this Amended Notice Of Appeal are true an o the be$ of his knowledge and 
r" + 4"- belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ,&'kLc. f day of / / L C  ,2009 
SEAL: 
- 
$ Commission expires: d; b - /& L> 
AMENDED NOTlCE OF APPEAL-5- 
IN THE DLSmCT COURT OF THE FOmm JUDIC 
TJ3E STAIE OP D M O ,  IN FOR TEE C O m  OF ADA 
WmW LIGHTNER and 
MARCLA L I G H m R ,  
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
JOHN HARDISON, BRENT RE=, 
and STEVE NELSON, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOC:O720 t 93 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The 
Court heard oral mgunents on Monday, December 22, 2008. The Plainti% appeared pro se, Mrs. 
Lightner in person and Mr. Lightner teiephonically from the Idaho Correctional Center. Mark 
Kubinski appeared for the Defendants. The Court took the matter under advisement at that time. For 
the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is granted. I 
BACKGROUND 
In 1989, Marcia Lightner received a withheld judgment for an u h o w n  charge, Af Marciu 
Ligl~tnur, Eshihit A. While serving a prison sentence, William Lightner met Marcia, who was a I 
000108 
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contract vendor at the comissary at the Idaho State Correctional hstibte (ISCI). Civil Rights 
Complaint, fl 27. In 1997, the couple married md William Lightner mmained incareer&ed. Civil 
Rights Compfaint, fl27. In 1998, William Li&tner used the grievance process in regard to visitation 
issue. AH Jill mittinaon, fi 13. The Ligh~ners objected to the prison policy that denid visitation 
to the couple. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, ( 29. Restricted visitation was granted and the 
Lightners objected to the form of the visitation granted. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, 7 
29. In 2000 or 2001, the Lightners received full visitation. First Amended Civil Rights Complaint, fl 
I I 29. In 2005 Willim Lightna granted parole. A$ John Hardifon, TI 6; Exhibit L). While he was on 
I I parole, the Lightners left the country and took up residence in Belize. Af Marcia Lightner, fl 6. 
On April 10,2007, Marcia Lightna was arrested for the felony offense of harboring a felon 
in violation of Idaho Code 9 18-205. Af Morcia Lightner, fi 5; Af Mark Kubinski, Exhibit A.  The 
11 following day she was released on bail. A$ Mmcia Lightner, 7 5.  Early in the morning on April 12. 
I I 2008, Marcia Lightner went to the Idaho State Correctional Institute and was informed that her I( visitation was suspended as a result of her arrest. A$ Marcia Lightner, ( 10. Subsequently, Marcia 
Lightner wrote to Warden Blades attempting to explain the circumstances of the event and pleading 
for reinstatement of visitation. A$ Marcia Lightner, Exhibit A. Warden Blades reinstated the 
I I Lightners' visitation on the condition that she keep the facility informed of the status of her case. -- - - -- 11 AN Marcia Lighfner, 1 16. Marcia Lightnqr contacted the staff in August 2007 with an update, but 
failed to provide any other updates. A 8  iMurcicl Lightner, 18. 
I I The Lightners have a history of violating facility policies. On November 29, 2006, William . 
I I Lightner accepted a visitation restriction when offered the choice of visitation restriction or a DOR - 
for violating the visitor contact rules at the beginning and conclusion of his visits with Marcia I/ . 
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I I Lightner. A 8  John Wardison, Exhibit C. On Dmember 28, 2006, William Lightner was issued a 1 I 
DOR for imppropriate goodbye. Id. On July 22,2007, other visitors to the Idaho State Corntiondl I I  - -  
II hstitute complained that M m i a  Lightner was changing the order of the visitors log and was 
inappropriately for visiting, including sheer, revealing c l o ~ n g  and a lack of undergments. 
Id. On August 27, 2007, Marcia Lightner parked in an accessible space but failed to display her 
.w. - - --- --- 
disabled identification permit. Zd. W e n  reminded to be sure that her permit was displayed, Marcia 
r . 
Lightner exhibited hostility to the officer. Id. 
On October 1, 2007, Marcia Lightner was Sormed by telephone that visitation was 
suspended because she was a security risk and that there was a possibility of reconsideration 
I/ pending the outcome of her case. A@" Marcia Ligktner, 7 21. Although requests for a personal 
II meeting were made, Director Brent Reinke did not meet with Marcia Lightner regarding the I 
visitation suspension. Affr Marcia Lightner, 7 23. No internal grievances relating to visitation issues I 
14 11 were filed by William Lightner between January 2007 and January 2008. A$ Jill liNittingon, 7 13. 1 
year probation sentence. AH Mark fibinski, Exhibit A. The harboring a felon charge was dismissed 
as part of the plea agreement. A$ Marcia Lightner, 1 3. The Lightners have had visitation since 
15 
16 
June 13, 2008. A f l  John tiardison, Exhibit ti. To compensate for the period of separation, the I 
On March 31, 2008, Marcia Lightna pled guilty to obstructing justice and received a two 
Lightners seek an award of $120,000 and $12,500.00 per missed visit-a total of nearly $1.5 I 
/I mill ion. Firsr Anzended Civif Rights Compluint, 1 I .  
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
2 4 
11 together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and I 
that the moving party is entitled to a judpent  as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). If the evidence 
reveals that no disputed issues of material f x t  exist, then only a question of law remains. First Sec. 
all reasonable inferences drawn h m  the record are to be &awn in favor of the non-moving party. 
See Williams v. BIakley, I I 4  Idaho 323, 324, 757 P.2d 186, 187 (1 988); Blake v. C m ,  108 Idaho 
253,255, 698 P.2d 315, 317 (1985). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that an adverse 
party may not simply rely upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits 
specific fats showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 
2 1 1,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set 
for~h facts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the amant is competent to testify. 
Id., 1.RC.P. 56(e). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must 
be anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create 
3 
4 
a genuine issue. Zirnmeman v. Volkrwugon ofdrnerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854,920 P.2d 67, 69 
( 1 996). 
Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654, 657 (1998). In a motion for 
smmary judment, all disputed facts ase construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party and 
WHETHER PLAINTIFF WILLIAM LICHTNER'S CLA~MS ARE BARRED UE TO HIS FAILURE TO 
EXHAUST HE lSCI GRIEVANCE PROCESS 
It is we11 established that a prisoner may not bring an action with respect to conditions of 
U.S.C. 5 1997e(a); Drennon v. Iiluho Slate Correciional Institution, 145 Idaho 598, 602, 1 8 1 P.3d 
524, 528 (2007). There is sufticient evidence in the record to indicate that ISCI has a grievance 
2 1  confinement without first exhausting available administrative remedies. Idaho Code $ 19-4206; 42 
2 3  
2 5 
procedure and that William Lightner was familiar with the prison grievance system, having used it 
26 
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in the pmt for similar ~ssu€%. There is a 1 ~  sumcimt evidence to ascertain &at not only did Mr. 
Lightner fail to exhaust the adminishative remedy pmcess, he failed to avail himself of this pmcess 
at all with regard to the October s 
Plaintifls assert that this is not a condition of confinement ease, "but only the termination of 
his wife's visitation privileges" and has "a constitutional issue of material fact." Response and 
Objation to State's Motion for S u m q  Judgment, 7 16. The Eighth Amendmenf, which prohibits 
cruel and unusual punishments, imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of 
confinement and to take reasonable measures to tee the safety of the h a w .  HeIIing v. 
McKinney. 509 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993). Conditions of conhment  that are subject to exhaustion 
ave been defined broadly by federal c o w  as the effects of actions by government officials on the 
ves of and discipline of persons confined in prisons. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 41 I U.S. 475, 499 
973); Smith v. Zachary, 255 F.3d 446,449 (7th Cir.2001); see also Lawrence v. Gourd, 304 F.3d 
198, 200 (2d Cir.2002); 18 U.S.C. 4 3626(g)(2). The detehnation of who may visit an inmate at 
what time, subject to what restrictions, and for how long is an action by a government oficials that 
has an efflect on the life of a person confined to prison. The Court finds that this is a condition of 
confinement case to which the exhaustion requirement applies. 
The Plaintiffs cite cases where the federal exhaustion requirement was held not to apply, but 
ese cases are very different from the one at hand. One cited case dealt with cell temperatures that 
uld cause inmates to become hypothennic. Mitcftefl x Shomig, 969 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. IL. 1997). 
Another dealt with unhealthy air. Bishop v. Lewis, 1 55 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1998). ~equiring inmates 
to follow a gievance procedure in a life threatening situation would be improper. The Lightners' 
00011.2 





lo 11 defendmt)). There is no respondeat superior liability under this section. Id. (citing Monell v. Dep't 
situation was not life Wtening.  Plaintiff William Lightnet failed to exhaust the DOC lgievance 
process. Defendants' motion for sumary judgment with regard to this issue is panted. 
WHETHER PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST D I R E ~ O R  B ENT  NU 
In order for a person acting under color of state law to be liable under Section 1983, there 
mu& be a showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation. Jones v. William, 297 




l1 I/ of Sbc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (rejecting the concept of respondeat superior liability in the 
personal pdcipation in the alleged constitutional violations); May v. Eitomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that section 1983 liability must be based on the personal involvement of the 
l2 I/ section 1983 context and requiring individual liability for the constitutional violation). Further, in a 
13 I I civil rights complaint, the circumstances constituting violation of a civil or constitutional right must 
" /I be stated in the complaint with particularity. 1.R.C.P. P(b) Plaintiffs do not identify any alleged 




20 I/ As stated above, in an inmate civil rights action, there must be a showing of personal 
constitutional violation personally caused by Director Reinke. Plaintiffs also fail to make any 
fa~tual allegations of constitutional violations against Director Reinke is their amended complaint. 
21 11  participation in the alleged rights deprivation and in any civil rights action the circumstances 
2 2  
2 3 
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constituting that violation must be stated with particularity. The record indicates that Mr. Nelson 
was not employed at the facility at the time of the October visitation suspension. A f l  John 
2 4 
2 5 
Hcir~liso~z, 7 12. As Mr. Nelson was not at the facility at the time of the visitation suspension, his 
II personal paicipation in it would not be possible. Defmhts '  motion for s m w  judment with 
11 The Unites States Constitution protects "certain kinds of highly personal relationships.'" 
2 
3 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 619-20 (1984). However, the United States 
regard to this issue is &;ranted. 
WHETHER THE DENIAL OF MARCIA LIGHTNER'S   IS IT AT ION VIOLATE HER CONSTITUTIONAL 
I I Supreme Court has limited the protection of relationships where incarceration is a factor. 
The very object of bprisommt is confinement. Many of the liberties and 
privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate 
does not retain rights inconsistat with proper incarceration. And, as our cases have 
established, freedom of association is among the rights least compatible with 
incarceration. Some curtailment of that freedom must be expected in the prison 
context. 
I I Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 1 26, 1 3 1 (2003) (citations omitted). 
11 Protected liberty interests "may arise from two sow-the Due Process Clause itself and 
I5 II the laws of the States." Ky. Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (quoting 
l6 11 Iiewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)). "The Due Process Clause of the federal constitution does 
17 I I not, of its own force, create a liberty interest . . . , for it is well settled that an inmate does not have a 
11 Rutherford. 468 U.S. 576 (1984). The denial of a prisoner's access to a particular visitor "is well 
18 liberty interest in the denial of contact visits by a spouse, relatives, children, and friends." Block v. 




23 I1 However, state statutes or regulations can create a due process liberty interest where none 
within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence." Thompson, 490 U.S. 
24 11 othewise would have existed. Tkotpson, 490 U.S. at 461. For a state law to create a liberty 
25 11 interest, it must contain "explicitly mandatory language." Tjtotnpson 490 U.S. at 4 m @ f t P q  




finding of guilt, the ternination of the privilege violated due process); Taylor v. Armontrout, 894 
9 I 
not created by negative impficaGons from mandatory language in prison rewlations. Sandin v. 
Conner, 5 15 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Rather, to create a liberty interest, the action taken must be an 
atypical and sill;nificmt deprivation from the norrnal incidents of prison life. Id. Where the language 
of state statutes and regulations create a right, that right is entitled to due process protection. See 
a n d o m  v. Blodgen, 960 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where a prison regulation 
10 
I I F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding regulation that stated peoples whose names appear on the list I 
l2 11 Idaho Board of Correction Rule 604 states in pertinent part: 
,, 
Nothing in Section 604 establishes a right to visit any inmate. Nothing in Section 604 
should be interpreted as an expectation Wit visitation will be approved between any 
person and any inmate if the Department has suspended, terminated, or revoked a 
visitor or inmate's visiting privileges. 
"shall'" be allowed to visit created a right to visitation entitled to due process protection). 
Inmate visitation is allowed at the discretion of the facility head or designee. Each 









A person who has pending criminal charges or who is the subject of a criminal 
investigation will not be permitted to visit an inmate, except upon written approval of 
the facility head or designee. 
IDAPA 06.01.01.604.01, .02, .05(j). 
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/I time, for any period of time at the discretion of the facility head in accordance with standard 
1 
11 operating procedm. IDAPA 06.01 .01.604.06. 
Additionally, Rule 604 m&m clear that visits may be s u s p d d  mhcted, or teminatd at any 






constitutional right. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). In 2003, the Unites States Supreme Court 
applied that test to a challenge to the constitutionality of a prison visihtion replation. Overton v. 
Bazzettu, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) The Turner factors are: 1) whether the regulation has a valid, 
rational comation to a legitimate govemmt interest; 2) whether alternative means are open to 
, , 
12 
11 on the prison to prove the validity of the regulation. Id. 'The status of a person as a prisoner or a I 
inrnates to exercise the asserted right; 3) what impact an a c c o m d i o n  of the right would have on 
guards and inmates and prison resources; and 4) whether there are ready alternatives to the 
13 regulation. Id. at 132. The burden is on the challenger to disprove the validity of the regulation, not 
15 
16 
Preventing an inmate h m  visiting with someone accused of harboring a fugitive serves the I 




affect both prisoners and non-prisoners." Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 68 1 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Thonbu~h v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,411 n. 9 (rejecting "any attempt to forge separate standards for 
cases implicating the rights of outsiders"). 
21 
22 
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legitimate penological purpose of protecting the security of the institution. Preventing visits which 




in the visiting area. The Court finds that Warden Hardison was acting with the penological purpose 
to preserve the safe, secure, and orderly operation of the facility. Alternative means of 
' cornmication are available to the Li&tners, they have regular telephone conversations and access 
to mail services. T h a e  aiternative m e t h h  of comunication were found suEcient by the United 
States Supreme Court in Overson. Based on the evidence provided, the Lightners' visits are 
challenging for the S, a on prison resowces, and unfb to other inmates in that more time 
must be spent with the Li&bers to the detriment of other visitors. As to the impact an 
a c c o m d t i o n  for the Lightners would have on guards and inmates and prison resources, even 
when viewed in the light most favodle  to the P l ~ t i f f s ,  the evidence shows that an attempt to 
accomodate the Lightners could have been w-nably time consuming and burdensome on the 
facility and the other inmates. In explanation of the fourth factor, the Unites States Supreme Court 
stated, "'Ticmer does not impose a least restrictive alternative test, but asks instead whether the 
prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted 
right while not h p s i n g  more than a de minimus cost to the valid penological goal." Overton, 539 
U.S. at 136, Plaintiffs have provided no such alternative nor does one seem to exist within the 
limited resources of the IDOC. 
The Plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden in showing the regulation to be 
unconstitutional. The Court finds that Marcia Lightner's constitutional rights have not been violated 
by the suspension of visitation. Defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to this issue 
is granted. 
WHETHER DEFENDANT HARDISON IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
The three-part inquiry to determine if a public officiaI asserting qualified immunity is 
entitled to the defense consists of: I.) Was there a clearly established law? 2.) Did the conduct of 
the party asserting qualified immunity violate a clearly established right of the party claiming the 
1 / ORDER GRANIING IIIFBIIDANTS' MOTION ioH IIIMIIAIY PDGMEhT - Page 10 I 
I / v. Kinchioe. 987 P.2d 189, 593 (9th Cir. 199))). Only where there is a genuine issue of fsst that 
2 
4 
v. Fernling, 125 Idaho 283, 286, 859 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1994). If a nable official could have 
believed that his actions were lawful, s m q  judwent on the basis of qualified i m m ~ l y  is
appropriate, NcKimey v, Vernon, 130 I M o  354,357,941 P.2d 327,329 (1997) (quoting Nernphill 





would preclude a grant of summary judgment, should the court let the case to proceed to trial. Id. 
Overton provides established law that visitation mgulations which are rationally related to a 




s w m i o n  of the Lightners' visitation. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, 
the c i r c m m c e s  surrounding the Lightners' visits are a security risk and costly to the facility. 
William Lightner would be a flight risk if he were to have an opportuity to leave the facility. 
14 
15 
19 I I WHETHER MARCIA LIGHTNER'S CLAIM FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM FAILS AS A ~ ~ A T I ' E R  OF LAW 
Marcia Li@ber was fooled by a fbgitive and assisted her in her flight. The warden's actions were 




Defendant Hardison is entitled to qualified imunity. Defendants'motion for s m q  judgment 
with regard to this issue is granted. 
2 o 
2 1  
2 2  
A claim for loss of consortium "'is a wholly derivative cause of action contingent upon a 
third party's tortious injury to a spouse." Runcorn v. Sheurer Lumber Prodtccfs, Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 




consortium claims based on the violation of the spouse's civil rights." Jeremiah v. Yunke Machine 
Shop, lnc., 13 1 Idaho 242, 249, 953 P.2d 992, 999 (1998). In Jeremiah, the Idaho Supreme Court 
2 6 000118 
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would not add a common law remedy which was not recognized in the statute, Title VII or the Idaho 
Human Ri&t.s Act. This case is similar. Mr. Li&tner asserts federal and state law claims that his 
civil rights were inFringed but neither Section 1983 nor the Habeas Corpus and Institutional 
Litigation Procedures Act, Idaho Code $$ 19-4201 to 19-4226, recognizes a loss of consortium 
cause of action. Even if Mr. Lightner's claim were not bared by his failure to exhaust 
administrative r m d e s  and if that claim were to have succeeded, a loss of consorlium claim based 
upon alleged violation of civil rights fails as a matter of law. Defendants' motion for summary 
judpent with regard to this issue is mted. 
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ll CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I I to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
2 
3 
I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on th&xday of January, 2009,I caused a true and correct copy 





ICC Unit-C PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
8 
U.S. hdail, Postage Prepajd 
Wand Delivered 
( ) Overni&t Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Marcia Lightner 
300 E. 41st Street 
Garden City, ID 83714 
l1 
12 
ail, Postage Prepaid 
::Gelived 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Mark Kubinski 
1299 N. Orchard, Ste. 1 10 
Boise, ID 83706 
()$ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
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CERTlFlGATE OF MAlLING 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY, That on the & day of Mach, 2009,I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL via US mail system to: 
MARK KUBINSKI 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENEWL 
PO BOX, 83720, 
ROLSE, IDAHO 83720-0010 
ADA COUNTY COURT WPORTER 
200 W FRONT STWET, 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-001 0 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL-6- 
LN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE F O m T H  JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiffs- Appellants, 
JOHN HARDISON, BRENT REDJKE and 
STEVE WLSON, 
Supreme COW Case No. 36259 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIIBITS 
I, 3. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the 
course of this action. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1. Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Surnmary Judgment, filed 
November 2 1,2008. 
2. Affidavit of Jill Urhittington, filed November 21,2008. 
3. Affidavit of Mark A. Kubinski, filed November 2 1,2008. 
4. Affidavit of John Hardison, filed November 21,2008. 
5. Affidavit of William Lightner, filed December 9,2008. 
6. Affidavit of Marcia Lightner, filed December 9,2008. 
7. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
December 15,2008. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court thls 22nd day of May, 2009. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
$$f& 
"CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
) ORDER GMNTING MOTION TO 
Plaintiffs- Appellants, 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 36259-2009 
) Ada County Docket No. 2007-20 193 
JOHN ILAmISON, BRENT KENKJE, 
STEVE NELSON, 
Defendants-Respondenls. 
APPELLANTS MOTION TO AUCMENT THE RECORD ON APPEAL WITH 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT and AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AUCMENT THE 
RECORD were filed by Appellants on July 27,2009. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion, as EXISIBITS: 
1. Motion to Amend Civil Rights Complaint, file-stamped April 2 1, 2008; 
2. Notice of Filing Affidavit in Support of Response to Defendants' Motion to Strike 
William Lightner's Affidavit w/ attachments, file-stamped December 19,2008; 
3. Amended Affidavit in Support of Amended Complaint w/ attachment, file-stamped 
April 23,2008; 
4. Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, file-stamped February 12,2009; 
5. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration w/ attachments, file-stamped 
February 12,2009; 
6. Affidavit of Marcia Lightner in Support of Motion for Reconsideration; file-stamped 
February 12,2009; and 
7. Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, file-stamped March 13,2009. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
William and Marcia Lightner, pro se 
Ill Ill 
XN THE DISTNCT C O m T  OF THE F0mTf-T m I C L A L  DZSTEUGTOF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
Plaintiffs- Appellants, 
JOHN W-ISON, B E N T  R E m  and 
STEVE mLSON, 
Supreme Court Case No. 36259 
CERTFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, J, DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERKS WCORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCWT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
WLLIAM LIGHTNER 
APPELLANT PRO SE 
BOISE, IDAHO 
$ 1  (L: 9 ";2QO 
J L ) ~ ~  &t;j 
. Date of Service: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 
IN THE: DISTRICT C O m T  OF THE FOURTH m I C W  DISTMCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUMTY OF ADA 
Plaintiffs- Appella~ts, 
STEVE MLSON, 
Supreme Court Case No. 36259 
CERTFICATE TO W C O m  
I, J. DAVID NAV 0 ,  Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
1 1" day of March, 2009. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District C o w  
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
